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Redefining marriage in a way that reduces it to a financial and legal 
relationship will only accelerate the deterioration of family life. 
Sen. John Cornyn (R-Texas)2
 
I couldn=t agree more.  Marriage is a bond that should be kept as distinct as 
possible from mere partnerships.  Senator Cornyn made these remarks in an attempt 
to counter Congressman Barney Frank=s (D-Mass.) observation that allowing same-
sex couples to marry does not harm anyone else=s marriage.  Now, I share Senator 
Cornyn=s desire to prevent the mercantilization of marriage, but the way to 
accomplish that goal is not to bar same-sex marriages but rather to bar the 
enforcement of prenuptial property-apportionment agreements—that is, to revive an 
                                                                
1 Professor of Law, Senior Advisor, Graduate Tax Program, Chicago-Kent College of 
Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. A.B.; 1968, J.D., 1972, Harvard.  In writing this article, 
I have benefited enormously from the shrewd advice and sternly critical judgments of Brian 
Bix, Daniel Hamilton, and Christopher Leslie, and I am grateful to them for their interest and 
assistance.  I must also thank my diligent and skillful student research assistants, Shani Austin, 
Andrew Corbett, Anna Misfeldt, and Hart Rosenblatt.  And I should like to thank the Marshall 
D. Ewell Research Fund for providing support for the writing of this article.  
2See Gay Lawmaker Testifies: “Who Are We Hurting?,” CHI. TRIB., Mar. 24, 2004, at 11. 
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old per se rule—since it is prenuptial agreements, not same-sex unions, that can 
“reduce” marriage to a financial relationship.3
Until the 1970s, American courts uniformly refused, on public policy grounds, to 
enforce prenuptial agreements designed to apportion property in the event of 
divorce.4  They regarded the enforcement of such contracts as inimical to the stability 
of marriage.5  But this view softened over the years as courts came to regard the 
                                                                
3Couples sometimes include behavioral provisions in their prenuptial contracts, with 
mixed results, in an attempt to regulate conduct during the marriage rather than to apportion 
property rights upon termination of the marriage.  See, e.g., Favrot v. Barnes, 332 So. 2d 873, 
875 (La. Ct. App. 1976), rev=d on other grounds, 339 So. 2d 843 (La. 1976) (refusing to treat 
as marital “fault” a wife=s demand for sexual intercourse more than the once per week 
stipulated in the couple=s prenuptial agreement); Koch v. Koch, 232 A.2d 157, 159-60 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967) (refusing to enforce a prenuptial agreement that the husband=s 
mother would reside with the couple); Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S.2d 100, 111 (Fam. Ct. 
1942) (enforcing a prenuptial agreement regarding the religious upbringing of the marital 
children).  See generally James Herbie Difonzo, Customized Marriage, 75 IND. L.J. 875, 939, 
955-56 (2000).  Such behavioral provisions lie beyond the scope of this article. 
4These contracts are also known as “antenuptial agreements” or “premarital agreements.”  
In view of the increasing popularity of the vernacular term “prenup,” I have elected to favor 
the term from which Aprenup was derived. 
5See infra text accompanying note 84.  Even when American courts were unwilling to 
enforce prenuptial property-apportionment agreements upon divorce, they were willing to 
enforce them at death.  That is, if a contract between a prospective husband and a prospective 
wife purported to limit her share of marital property in the event of divorce and her share of 
the husband=s estate in the event he predeceased her, a court that was unwilling to enforce the 
former provision would nonetheless enforce the latter.  See, e.g., McNutt v. McNutt, 19 N.E. 
115 (Ind. 1888); In re Muxlow Estate, 116 N.W.2d 43 (Mich. 1962); Cronacher v. Runge, 98 
S.W.2d 603 (Mo. 1936); In re Estate of Eisner, 181 N.Y.S.2d 327 (Sur. Ct. 1959); see also 
Uhrig v. Pulliam, 713 S.W.2d 649 (Tenn. 1986).  
The doctrinal explanation [for this difference in treatment] was that death-focused 
premarital agreements did not give either party an incentive to divorce.  One also 
might speculate that an attempt to keep a family heirloom or other family property 
within a family—apparently a common purpose of such agreements—is more 
sympathetic than a divorced-focused agreement, in which, paradigmatically, a richer 
prospective spouse asks a poorer prospective spouse to give up rights to all but a small 
part of the wealth and income of the richer prospective spouse.   
Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love:  The Enforcement of Premarital Agreements 
and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 153 (1998) (footnotes 
omitted).  One might quarrel with the proposition that a death-focused prenuptial agreement 
does not give either spouse an incentive to divorce; one can readily imagine that  
a dissatisfied wife—secure in the knowledge that the provisions for alimony contained 
in the antenuptial agreement could not be enforced against her, but that she would be 
bound by the provisions limiting or waiving her property rights in the estate of her 
husband—might provoke her husband into divorcing her in order to collect a large 
alimony check . . . rather than take her chances on being remembered generously in 
her husband=s will. 
Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 383 (Fla. 1970), rev=d on other grounds, 257 So. 2d 530 
(Fla. 1972).  Of course, a wife might make the same strategic determination even in the 
absence of a prenuptial agreement if she were confident that state alimony and 
division-of-property laws provided more generous benefits than her husband=s probable will or 
the state=s elective share statute.  In any case, the enforceability of death-focused prenuptial 
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societal interest in marriage as less compelling than the individual=s interest in his 
own autonomy.  Today, “divorced-focused premarital agreements regarding the 
division of property and spousal support are . . . enforceable in almost every state,”6 
despite warnings from a number of scholars that this development operates to the 
disadvantage of women.7  So here I stand, urging that we revive the old rule 
prohibiting altogether the enforcement of prenuptial agreements, but I do so not 
because these agreements encourage divorce or disfavor women, but rather because 
they permit married couples, inequitably, to make simultaneous, inconsistent claims:  
that of forming a privileged unit founded on mutual sacred pledges of devotion and 
loyalty, and that of being parties to a custom-built partnership between two 
autonomous bargainers.8  This inequity is not an inequity between men and women; 
that inequity will, it is hoped, vanish over time.  Rather, the inequity of which I 
speak is an inequity between the married and the unmarried. 
This article is divided into five parts.  The first part discusses the justification for 
our society=s continued promotion of the institution of marriage.  The second 
discusses why prenuptial agreements have become so widespread.  The third gives 
an account of American courts= shift from rejecting prenuptial agreements to 
routinely enforcing them.  The fourth presents my argument for treating as 
inequitable per se the enforcement of prenuptial agreements.  And the fifth explores 
how the adoption of my view of prenuptial agreements might affect the popularity of 
marriage. 
I.  HOW MARRIAGE HELPS OUR SOCIETY 
It is by now a commonplace observation that American law confers on married 
couples numerous benefits and privileges not conferred on unmarried couples.9  I am 
prepared to defend these legal incentives to marry and stay married because the 
                                                           
agreements is sufficiently noncontroversial that this article will be concerned solely with the 
enforceability of divorce-focused agreements. 
6 Bix, supra note 5, at 158. 
7E.g., Gail Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements and Gender Justice, 6 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 229 (1994). 
8I make no objection to the enforcement of divorce-related settlement agreements or other 
postnuptial contracts affecting the distribution of property.  In a postnuptial settlement, the 
parties bargain in the shadow of state default rules that have in fact already become 
enforceable:  state default rules premised on the “mutual sacred pledges” view of marriage. 
9In 1997, the General Accounting Office reported that 1,049 federal laws condition 
benefits and privileges on one=s marital status.  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEFENSE OF 
MARRIAGE ACT, GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE REP. OGC-97-16, at 2 (1997).  Professor Janet 
Halley of Harvard Law School “acknowledges ‘the tremendous asset transfers to marriages in 
our system’ that serve as ‘subsidies’ to encourage and support marriage.”  Harbour Fraser 
Hodder, The Future of Marriage, 107 HARV. MAG. 38, 43 (Nov.-Dec., 2004). 
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institution of marriage benefits society as a whole.10  But in what way does marriage 
benefit society?11
For most Americans, child-rearing, though undeniably important, is not the 
primary consideration underlying marriage.  In a 24-nation comparative poll 
sponsored by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, 
subjects were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with various statements.  With 
the statement “The main purpose of marriage these days is to have children,” 69.5% 
of the U.S. subjects disagreed; that was the second-highest rate of disagreement 
among the 24 nations surveyed (only New Zealand was higher).12  And the United 
States Supreme Court has held on a number of occasions that States may not 
condition the right to marry on an intention to produce or an ability to provide for 
children.13  Rather, Americans see marriage as an institution primarily related to 
romantic love and companionship.14
                                                                
10See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 403 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“When a 
State allocates benefits or burdens, it may have valid reasons for treating married and 
unmarried persons differently.  Classification based on marital status has been an accepted 
characteristic of tax legislation, Selective Service rules, and Social Security regulations.”). 
11By “marriage” I refer principally to solemnized marriage as opposed to so-called 
common law marriage.  The latter institution treats a man and woman as married, even though 
they have not obtained a marriage license and gone through an established ceremonial 
proceeding, if they (1) intended to enter into a husband/wife relationship, (2) openly lived 
together as husband and wife, and (3) have met certain other conditions that vary somewhat 
from state to state.  Today, only 11 states and the District of Columbia recognize common law 
marriage, LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 84 (3d ed. 2002), 
although, under well-established conflicts rules, the remaining states will recognize as valid 
within their own borders common law marriages inaugurated in a state that allows them.  E.g., 
Blaw-Knox Constr. Equip. Co. v. Morris, 596 A.2d 679 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991); 
Peffley-Warner v. Bowen, 778 P.2d 1022 (Wash. 1989).  But inasmuch as the marital benefits 
of which I am about to speak are more likely to be associated with solemnized marriage than 
with common law marriage, I shall confine my discussion to the former.  See Craig A. 
Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union:  A Legal and Social Analysis of 
Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1164, 1185 (1992) (“[Even if] 
marriage conferred no legal rights or obligations, it seems likely that the state would continue 
to solemnize marriages because that is what people want—a public commitment and a right to 
hold themselves out as something different [from what] they were before the marriage.”). 
12TOM W. SMITH, NAT’L OPINION RESEARCH CTR., UNIV. OF CHICAGO, THE EMERGING 21st 
CENTURY AMERICAN FAMILY 11 (1999), available at http://www.norc.uchicago.edu/online/ 
emerge.pdf (on file with author). 
13E.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987) (holding that prison inmates have a 
constitutional right to marry even though they will never be able to cohabit with their spouses 
or consummate the marriage); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1978) (holding that 
a state may not bar an indigent person from obtaining a marriage license merely because he 
already has children from a previous liaison who are public charges). 
14SMITH, supra note 12, at 11.  This American perspective on marriage—like so many 
American perspectives—has its roots in seventeenth century English Puritanism.  One modern 
scholar, after remarking upon the lack of what we should regard as emotional intimacy in the 
marriages depicted in Shakespeare=s plays, observed: 
Shakespeare was not alone in his time in finding it difficult to portray or even imagine 
marital intimacy.  It took decades of Puritan insistence on the importance of 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol53/iss3/3
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The core notion is “belonging,” to use Dean Hafen=s deceptively artless term.15  
We are, as a species, social creatures, unable to flourish without a sense of 
connectedness. 
Man, said Aristotle, is the least self-sufficient of animals.  But the human 
individual is not merely an animal who happens to lack self-sufficiency; 
he is an animal whose essence it is to lack self-sufficiency.  We need each 
other, and it is Aristotle=s task to make, as it were, a virtue of this 
necessity.  The life of belonging to a polis is not . . . a grudging 
dependence, but a positive and essentialist embrace of interdependence.16
Personal intimacy fosters this willingness to embrace interdependence, and it does so 
not simply by alleviating the pain of loneliness or easing “the existential sadness that 
comes from relating to other persons only through one=s bargains and episodic 
encounters,”17 but by providing an environment in which the skills and habits of 
harmonious engagement—so necessary to our collective well-being—may be honed 
and applied.18
                                                           
companionship in marriage to change the social, cultural, and psychological 
landscape.  By the time Milton published Paradise Lost in 1667, the landscape was 
decisively different.  Marriage was no longer the consolation prize for those who did 
not have the high vocation of celibacy; it was not the doctrinally approved way of 
avoiding the sin of fornication; it was not even principally the means of generating 
offspring and conveying property.  It was about the dream of long-term love. 
STEPHEN GREENBLATT, WILL IN THE WORLD:  HOW SHAKESPEARE BECAME SHAKESPEARE 
128-29 (2004).  Although he does not say so, Professor Greenblatt=s references to marriage as 
a consolation prize and as an approved way of avoiding fornication presumably have their 
roots in one of the Epistles of St. Paul: 
Yes, it is a good thing for a man not to touch a woman; but since sex is always a 
danger, let each man have his own wife and each woman her own husband. . . . There 
is something I want to add for the sake of widows and those who are not married:  it is 
a good thing for them to stay as they are, like me [i.e., celibate], but if they cannot 
control the sexual urges, they should get married, since it is better to be married than 
to be tortured. 
1 Corinthians 7:1-2 & 7:8-9 (Jerusalem Bible). 
15See Bruce C. Hafen,  Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law:  The Waning of 
Belonging, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1 (1991). 
16Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, 25 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 751, 767 (1992) (footnotes omitted). 
17Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage:  A Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV. 129, 200 
(2003) (eloquently summarizing the views expressed in Milton C. Regan, Jr., Postmodern 
Family Law:  Toward a New Model of Status, in PROMISES TO KEEP: DECLINE AND RENEWAL 
OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 157 (David Popenoe et al. eds., 1996)); see also Jane Larson, The 
Sexual Injustice of the Traditional Family, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 997, 999 (1992) (“It is within 
families that . . . we seek and give the love and companionship that makes it possible for us to 
survive the loneliness and harshness of our lives.”). 
18See Katharine K. Baker, Biology for Feminists, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 805, 831 (2000) 
(“Spouses . . . have always provided a forum for intimacy by allowing their partners to feel 
less atomized, more emotional, and more connected to others.  This work—which is the work 
of intimacy—and the feelings it engenders should be recognized as important, possibly even 
crucial, to our collective well-being.”) (footnote omitted). 
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The struggle for intimacy, if successful, yields not only individual benefits but 
societal benefits.  Like any struggle, the pursuit of intimacy requires effort, and state-
sanctioned marriage offers the individual a respite from that effort.  Paradoxically, 
the “bond” of matrimony liberates the individual so that he may make himself more 
valuable to the polis: 
The marital bond that now holds opposite-sex couples together (and by 
example encourages same-sex couples to think of themselves as 
conjoined) would loosen [if state-sponsored marriage were abolished]; 
pairing-off might grow more provisional, requiring more effort to keep 
up.  These struggles would take time away from other pursuits.  It seems 
plausible to speculate that individuals who can never obtain respite from 
competing for intimacy would have less to offer (including, for example, 
political engagement, the building of economic wealth, the care of 
children, or expanding the frontiers of human knowledge and 
accomplishment) than those not competing in this market.19
The more reliable the bond, the greater the liberation and the greater the societal 
benefit.  And marriage has shown itself to be more reliable than (heterosexual) 
cohabitation, even in an age when Americans believe they have a “fundamental right 
to marry, and marry, and marry.”20
Compared with heterosexual cohabitation, marriage is more stable and its 
commitments are more durable.21  Some of this greater stability results from the 
powerful societal endorsement—the governmental grant of a license, the judicial or 
sacramental solemnization—that marriage enjoys.22  But much of the stability is 
attributable to the barriers to marital dissolution that the law imposes:  the greater 
exit costs for marital partners than for “mere” cohabitants.23  Social scientists have 
                                                                
19Bernstein, supra note 17, at 206; see also Stephanie Coontz, Marriage, A History From 
Obedience to Intimacy, or How Love Conquered Marriage 309 (2005). 
[Marriage] remains the highest expression of commitment in our culture and comes 
packaged with exacting expectations about responsibility, fidelity, and intimacy.  
Married couples may no longer have a clear set of rules about which partner should do 
what in their marriage.  But they do have a clear set of rules about what each partner 
should not do.  And society has a clear set of rules for how everyone else should and 
should not relate to each partner.  These commonly held expectations and codes of 
conduct foster the predictability and security that make daily living easier. 
Id. at 309 (second emphasis added).  See also Hafen, supra note 15, at 41. 
20Mary Ann Glendon, The New Marriage and the New Property, in MARRIAGE AND 
COHABITATION IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETIES:  AREAS OF LEGAL SOCIAL AND ETHICAL CHANGE 
59, 63 (John M. Eekelaar & Sanford N. Fetz eds., 1980). 
21Steven L. Nock, A Comparison of Marriages and Cohabiting Relationships, 16 J. FAM. 
ISSUES 53, 56 (1995). 
22See supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also infra note 178 and accompanying 
text. 
23See Nock, supra note 21, at 56.   
Marriage differs so much from cohabitation legally because of the durability of the 
commitments involved.  Even after a divorce, one may be held legally obligated to an 
ex-spouse (and to children). . . . Moreover, the legal events of marriage (e.g., 
formalization of the union requiring significant effort to terminate it or legal 
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found that marital partners are more committed to each other than unmarried 
heterosexual cohabitants.24  Because of the higher exit costs, marital partners invest 
more in their relationship than do unmarried cohabitants.25  For example: 
We found [heterosexual] cohabitors more likely than married people to 
engage in infidelity, even when we controlled for permissiveness of 
personal values regarding extramarital sex.  This finding suggests that 
cohabitors= lower investments in their unions [i.e., because exit costs are 
higher when you=re married, cohabitors risk less by having an affair than 
married persons do], not their less conventional values, accounted for their 
greater risk of infidelity.26
This is not to say that matrimonial bonds are an unmixed blessing for the 
individual,27 but the greater stability of marital relationships generates collective 
benefits. 
II.  WHY PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS ARE POPULAR 
Prenuptial agreements are hardly a new phenomenon, but they began life not as 
divorce-focused instruments but as death-focused instruments.  And, unlike today=s 
agreements, they were not designed to protect the assets of the husband.28  Starting in 
                                                           
assumptions about joint property) serve as . . . barriers that hold the relationship 
together. 
Id. 
24J. Thomas Oldham, Unmarried Partners and the Legacy of Marvin v. Marvin:  Lessons 
from Jerry Hall v. Mick Jagger Regarding U.S. Regulation of Heterosexual Cohabitants, or 
Can=t Get No Satisfaction, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1409, 1426-27 (2001). 
25Cf. Sidney v. Sidney, 4 Swab. & Tris. 178, 182, 164 Eng. Rep. 1485, 1486 (1865) 
(“Those for whom shame has no dread, honourable vows no tie, and violence to the weak no 
sense of degradation, may still be held in check by an appeal to their love of money.”). 
26Judith Treas & Deidre Giesen, Sexual Infidelity Among Married and Cohabiting 
Americans, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 48, 59 (2000). 
27Married women do more housework than unmarried women.  M.V. LEE BADGETT, 
MONEY, MYTHS, AND CHANGE:  THE ECONOMIC LIVES OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 147 (2001) 
(citing Scott J. South and Glenna Spitze, Housework in Marital and Nonmarital Households, 
59 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 327-48 (1994) (“[O]n average, women . . . do more housework 
than men, but the gender gap is higher in married couples than in unmarried cohabiting 
(opposite-sex) couples or any other living situation.  When women live with men, either 
cohabiting or in marriage, they increase their time spent doing >female-typed= tasks Cmeal 
preparation and clean up, housecleaning, laundry, and shoppingCwith married women 
increasing their hours more than cohabiting women.”). 
28Today, prenuptial agreements generally are designed to protect the husband=s assets 
rather than the wife=s.  For example, a survey of the 39 reported divorce cases of 1992 that 
involved a challenge to a prenuptial agreement revealed that in 33 of those cases it was the 
wife who brought the challenge.  Barbara A. Atwood, Ten Years Later:  Lingering Concerns 
About the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, 19 J. LEGIS. 127, 154 n.29 (1993).  That is, it 
was the wife rather than the husband who found the agreement to be less generous than the 
state=s equitable distribution regime.  Another writer, some twenty years earlier, stated that 
cases in which the spouse challenging a prenuptial agreement is the husband rather than the 
wife “are practically nonexistent.”  Charles W. Gamble, The Antenuptial Contract, 26 U. 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
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the sixteenth century, a time when husband and wife were considered one person 
(the husband), “[d]aughters of noble and wealthy European families, and later 
daughters of well-to-do American families, entered into premarital agreements to 
insure that if they died without children, their blood relatives rather than their 
husbands would inherit their wealth.”29  Today, however, the focus generally is on 
divorce, and the contracts generally are instituted not by a prospective spouse=s 
family but by the prospective spouse himself. 
Prospective spouses enter into prenuptial agreements because they wish, in the 
event of divorce, to divide their property in a manner different from that prescribed 
by the state=s standard property-apportionment rules.  I say “they,” but generally it is 
“he,”30 for the primary purpose of most prenuptial agreements is to protect the wealth 
and earnings of the economically superior prospective spouse from being distributed 
to the economically weaker prospective spouse in the event of divorce, and the 
economically superior spouse is usually the male.31  To understand the nature of the 
protection afforded by prenuptial agreements, however, one must understand the 
property-apportionment rules that apply in their absence. 
Putting aside the question of child support,32 a divorcing spouse potentially has 
two economic entitlements:  an outright share of the marital assets, and periodic 
                                                           
MIAMI L. REV. 692, 724 (1972).  Still, examples of challenges by the husband can be found.  
See In re Marriage of Higgason, 516 P.2d 289, 290 (Cal. 1973) (“The parties hereto were 
married March 2, 1969.  At that time, the wife was 73 years old, and the husband was 48.  The 
wife is a woman with substantial assets, whereas the husband at the time of the marriage was a 
waiter, earning $2 an hour plus tips, and had little or no means.”); see also Gould v. Rafaeli, 
822 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (involving a marriage between a wealthy widow and an 
impecunious cabdriver). 
29Lynn Wintriss, Waiver of REA Rights in Premarital Agreements, PROB. & PROP., May-
June 1993, at 16.  One cannot help wondering what the bride=s wealthy family would have 
done if the happy spouses had mutually rescinded the contract after the wedding. 
30But see sources cited supra note 28 for examples of prenuptial agreements demanded by 
women. 
31 Brod, supra note 7, at 273.  
As a class, women earn less than men. . . . Even the most highly paid women . . . 
suffer from the gender gap in earnings. . . . For example, in medicine and dentistry, 
women [in 1989] were earning >just over half as much as men.=  The average yearly 
pay for female lawyers was $61,773 while the average yearly pay for male lawyers 
was $92,148.  Thus, even a highly compensated woman who marries a similarly 
situated man is likely to be disadvantaged by a premarital agreement that shelters each 
spouse=s income from the state-mandated income sharing. 
Id. at 241-42 (footnotes omitted); see also SMITH, supra note 12 (reporting that data from 1994 
revealed that in only 22.5% of “dual-earner families” did the wife have a higher income than 
the husband). 
32Even today, when American courts are willing to enforce the property-apportionment 
provisions of prenuptial agreements, they generally refuse to enforce prenuptial bargains 
relating to child support, child custody, or child visitation.  See, e.g., Edwardson v. 
Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941, 946 (Ky. 1990); Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1986).  
The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, which strongly favors enforcement of prenuptial 
agreements generally, prohibits such agreements from adversely affecting “the right of a child 
to support.”  UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, ' 3(b), 9C U.L.A. 35, 43 (2001). 
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maintenance payments (often called alimony) from the other spouse.33  Except in 
community property states,34 the first entitlement is of much more recent vintage 
than the second. 
A.  Apportionment of “Marital Property” Upon Divorce in Common Law Property 
States 
Originally, at common law, “marital property” per se did not exist; divorce courts 
awarded property solely on the basis of predivorce title.35  Even as late as 1978, a 
traditional homemaker “could leave a 40-year marriage with essentially no property, 
even though her husband had created a valuable business during the marriage, 
relying in part on her assistance.”36  Indeed, some courts responded with outrage to 
the suggestion that a wife=s nonpecuniary contributions to a husband=s business or 
professional practice should generate property-entitlements on divorce.37  “He who 
earns it owns it,”38 was the prevailing view. 
                                                                
33Although most states have one statutory provision authorizing judicial property-
apportionment and another authorizing the award of alimony, in practice the distinction 
between property claims and alimony claims has begun to blur, Suzanne Reynolds, The 
Relationship of Property Division and Alimony:  The Division of Property to Address Need, 56 
FORDHAM L. REV. 827, 832-34 (1988), and courts now often base property-apportionment 
decisions in part on need-related factors (age, health, sources of income) that traditionally and 
doctrinally were associated only with alimony.  Id. at 844-45; see, e.g., Weigel v. Weigel, 604 
N.W.2d 462 (N.D. 2000).  Also responsible for this blurring of conceptual boundaries is the 
growing prevalence of private settlement agreements concluded by divorcing parties at the 
time of the divorce.  See Marygold Shire Melli, Howard S. Erlanger, & Elizabeth Chambliss, 
The Process of Negotiation: An Exploratory Investigation in the Context of No-Fault Divorce, 
40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1133, 1143 (1988); Austin Sarat & L.F. Felstiner, Law and Strategy in 
the Divorce Lawyer=s Office, 20 L. & SOC=Y REV. 93, 109 (1986).  Private agreements often 
seem to treat “alimony” payments and “property” payments interchangeably or reflect the 
drafter=s awareness that tax benefits may turn on whether a payment is characterized as 
alimony or property.  In the interests of clarity, however, I shall adhere in this article to the 
traditional approach and accord separate treatment to property awards and alimony awards. 
34Nine states apply community property principles to the regulation of marital property: 
Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, New Mexico, Nevada, Texas, Washington, and 
Wisconsin.  Wisconsin is not a community property state by tradition, like the other eight; but 
when it adopted the UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY ACT, 9A U.L.A. 103 (1998), the first (and 
so far the only) state to do so, it thereby joined the community property ranks, inasmuch as the 
property-apportionment regime under the UMPA is essentially a community property regime.  
See William Reppy, The Uniform Marital Property Act:  Some Suggested Revisions for a 
Basically Sound Act, 21 HOUS. L. REV. 679, 683 (1984). 
35LAWRENCE J. GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY 1-2 (1983). 
36AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES] ' 4.02, reporter’s notes cmt. a (2000) (citing 
Saff v. Saff, 402 N.Y.S.2d 690, 693 (S. Ct. App. Div. 1978), appeal dismissed, 389 N.E.2d 
142 (N.Y. 1979). 
37See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 117 (2000) (citing DeWitt v. DeWitt, 296 N.W.2d 761, 767 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1980).  In DeWitt, the court reasoned that awarding entitlements to a wife on such a basis 
“treats the parties as though they were strictly business partners, one of whom has made a 
calculated investment in the commodity of the other=s professional training, expecting a dollar 
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Still, there were stirrings on the other side of the issue.  In 1963, for example, an 
official report to the President=s Commission on the Status of Women made the 
following recommendation: 
Marriage as a partnership in which each spouse makes a different but 
equally important contribution is increasingly recognized as a reality . . . . 
During marriage, each spouse should have a legally defined and 
substantial right in the earnings of the other [spouse], in the real and 
personal property acquired through those earnings, and in their 
management.  Such a right should be legally recognized as surviving the 
marriage in the event of its termination by divorce, annulment, or death.39
While common law property states have remained unwilling to implement such 
shared-ownership principles during a marriage=s existence, they became willing over 
the years, as evidence accumulated as to the injustice of the old he-who-earns-it-
owns-it rule,40 to apply these principles on divorce.  By the mid-1980s, all common 
law property states had adopted by statute some sort of “equitable distribution” 
regime, whereby divorce courts were authorized to assign property to one spouse or 
the other without regard to predivorce legal ownership or the source of the earnings 
used to acquire it.41
The equitable distribution statutes adopted in common law property states 
generally borrow from community property law the distinction between property that 
“belongs” in some sense to the couple qua couple (marital property), and property 
that belongs to only one of the spouses individually (separate property).42  Of course, 
the details of the categorization standards vary considerably from state to state.  If a 
business that one spouse owned before marriage (and is therefore separate property) 
appreciates during the marriage, some states treat the entire appreciation as marital 
                                                           
for dollar return.” Id.  The court further noted that most “marital planning” is not “so coldly 
undertaken.”  Id.  See also Hoak v. Hoak, 370 S.E.2d 473, 478 (W. Va. 1988) (AMarriage is 
not a business arrangement, and this Court would be loath to promote any more tallying of 
respective debits and credits than already occurs in the average household.”). 
38 Williams, supra note 37, at 121. 
39PRESIDENT=S COMM=N ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, AMERICAN WOMEN: REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT=S COMM=N ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 47 (1963). 
40One of the most glaringly unjust applications of the old understanding was Fischer v. 
Wirth, 326 N.Y.S.2d 308 (App. Div. 1971), a case in which the wife had “used her earnings 
for family expenses while the husband [had] used his earnings to accumulate real and personal 
property in his name only.  The court found that the wife had no equitable claim on this 
property.”  Id. at 310-11; see also Reynolds, supra note 33, at 836 n.44. 
41ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 36, ' 4.02, reporter’s notes cmt. a; GRACE G. BLUMBERG, 
COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA 4 (2d ed. 1993).  For example, in Weigel v. Weigel, 604 
N.W.2d 462 (N.D. 2000), the court regarded the house where the couple had resided as marital 
property subject to equitable—indeed, 50/50—distribution, even though the husband had 
provided the entire down payment from his own separate property.  Accord Mann v. Mann, 
979 P.2d 497 (Wyo. 1999). 
42Community property states use the term community property” where common law 
property states would use “marital property.”  Both systems use the term “separate property” 
identically. 
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property,43 while others treat as marital property only that portion of the appreciation 
attributable to the use of other marital property or to the personal efforts of either 
spouse (as distinguished, say, from appreciation attributable to inflation or other 
market conditions beyond the influence of either spouse).44  Some states hold that a 
spouse=s professional degree is marital property,45 while others (a greater number) 
hold that it is not.46  But once the categorization is made, states largely agree as to the 
consequences:  Marital property is subject to equitable distribution; separate property 
is not.47
Of course, the mere identification and valuation of those assets that are 
considered “marital” does not entirely dispose of the property-division problem.  
Equitable distribution must be “equitable,” and again, state standards vary widely.  
Trial courts must consider many factors—generally statutory factors—in deciding 
upon a plan of distribution, but most of these factors relate in some way or another to 
two considerations:  the need of each party and the contribution of each party.48   A 
                                                                
4323 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. ' 3501(a) (2001); Anthony v. Anthony, 514 A.2d 91 (Pa. 
Super. 1986). 
44VA. CODE ANN. ' 20-107.3.A.3.a (West 2001). 
45E.g., Daniels v. Daniels, 418 N.W.2d 924, 927 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); O=Brien v. 
O=Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 713 (N.Y. 1985). 
46E.g., In re Marriage of McVey, 641 P.2d 300 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981); In re Marriage of 
McManama, 399 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 1980); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979). 
47Not all common-law property states explicitly differentiate between marital property and 
separate property.  A few states purport to render vulnerable to equitable distribution all 
property owned by either or both spouses.  See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. ' 31-15-7-4(b) (West. 
1999) (“The court shall divide the property of the parties, whether:  (1) owned by either 
spouse before the marriage; (2) acquired by either spouse in his or her own right [during the 
marriage]; or (3) acquired by their joint efforts, in a just and reasonable manner.”); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 15, ' 751(a) (2002).  But these so-called “one pot” or “all property” jurisdictions (as 
opposed to the “dual property” jurisdictions discussed in the text) direct their courts, in 
determining a just and reasonable division of a couple=s assets, to consider factors that are 
traditionally used in dual property states to distinguish separate property from marital.  See, 
e.g., IND. CODE ANN. ' 31-15-7-5(1) (West 1999) (“[t]he contribution of each spouse to the 
acquisition of the property.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, ' 751(b)(11) (2002) (“[t]he contribution 
of each spouse in the acquisition, preservation, and depreciation or appreciation in value of the 
respective [assets], including the nonmonetary contribution of a spouse as a homemaker.”). 
The American Law Institute recommends a “dual property” system.  ALI PRINCIPLES, 
supra note 36, '' 4.09, 4.11. 
48ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 36, ' 4.09 cmt. a.  To some extent, “need” and 
“contribution” represent a conflicting vision of the nature of marriage: “need” suggests a 
dependency model, while “contribution” suggests a partnership model.  For a discussion of the 
tensions caused by this conflict, see Martha Albertson Fineman, Societal Factors Affecting the 
Legal Rules for Distribution of Property, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW:  FEMINISM AND 
LEGAL THEORY 265, 271-78 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Nancy Sweet Thomadsen eds. 
1991) (“The third most commonly listed factor [in a comprehensive survey, after ‘need’ and 
>contribution=] was the length of the marriage, which can be relevant only as an influence on 
the application of the primary factors of contribution (which perhaps lessens in importance 
with increasing duration) and need (which perhaps increases in importance with increasing 
duration.”)). In many states, marital fault bears upon equitable distribution.  See, e.g., Ex Parte 
O=Daniel, 515 So. 2d 1250 (Ala. 1987); Davis v. Davis, 458 N.W.2d 309 (N.D. 1990).  A 
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small number of states, by statute, presume that equitableness requires a 50/50 split 
between the spouses, or at least treat 50/50 as “the starting point” for any 
determination,49 but courts in those states must nonetheless weigh the same “need” 
and “contribution” factors to determine whether a claimant has successfully rebutted 
the presumption or justified a departure from the starting point. 
B.  Apportionment of Property Upon Divorce in Community Property States 
The community property system operating in nine American states 
is based on a sharing or partnership theory of marriage, which presumes 
that each spouse contributes equally, in a direct or indirect manner, to the 
accumulation of assets during the marriage. . . . [T]he system, in general, 
regards most property acquired through the efforts of [either or] both 
spouses as community property.  [Treated as separate property are] assets 
that a spouse acquired prior to marriage [as well as assets acquired] by 
individual gift or inheritance during marriage.50
Thus, for example, any wages that either spouse receives for services performed 
during marriage are regarded as community property.  And when a marriage is 
terminated by divorce, each spouse may keep his separate property and is also 
entitled to take with him his one-half share—outright, not an undivided share—of the 
accumulated community property, although most community property states have, in 
fact, modified the traditional 50/50 rule by enacting equitable distribution statutes.51  
(Any departure from strict 50/50 distribution of community property necessarily 
awards to one spouse a portion of the other spouse=s separate property.) 
                                                           
majority of states , however, reject fault as a distribution factor.  See, e.g., Horst v. Horst, 623 
P.2d 1265, 1270-71 (Haw. Ct. App. 1981); Kanta v. Kanta, 479 N.W.2d 505, 508 (S.D. 1991); 
TENN. CODE ANN. ' 36-4-121 (2004).  See generally ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 36, at ch. 1, 
Topic 2, reporter=s notes.  But a jurisdiction that rejects fault, in the sense of adultery or 
cruelty, as a factor to be weighed in making equitable distribution may nonetheless treat 
financial misconduct—e.g., dissipation of marital property by means of gifts to a paramour—
as a distribution factor.  See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 36, at ' 4.10. 
49E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. ' 9-12-315 (2003); IND. CODE ANN. ' 31-15-7-5 (West 1999); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. ' 50-20(c) (West Supp. 2003). The American Law Institute likewise 
recommends this approach.  ALI PRINCIPLES, note 36 supra, at ' 4.09(1). 
50JOHN DE WITT GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 72-73 (2d ed. 2001).  
Unlike the common law property system, the community property system gives each spouse 
marriage-based property entitlements during the marriage, not merely upon death or 
dissolution.  For example, neither spouse may validly convey or encumber community real 
property without the written consent of the other spouse.  E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. ' 32-912 
(1996). 
51See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. ' 26.09.080 (West 1997).  See supra text 
accompanying notes 48-49. 
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C.  Alimony52 Awards in Common Law Property and Community Property States 
It goes by many names—alimony, spousal support, spousal maintenance—but its 
essence is universally understood:  an obligation judicially imposed on one spouse to 
continue contributing to the other spouse=s support even after their marriage is over.53  
While courts in almost all American jurisdictions do indeed enforce such an 
extended obligation,54 they disagree as to its moral or doctrinal foundation.55  Some 
courts, particularly in cases involving long-term marriages, regard alimony as a tool 
for allowing the less wealthy spouse to continue to enjoy after divorce the lifestyle 
she had enjoyed during the marriage.  In Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, for example, a 
wife who had been assigned almost $6 million of property in equitable distribution 
was held entitled to an alimony award of $2,000 per week in addition:  “[T]he central 
objective of alimony is, subject to the availability of resources, maintenance of the 
more dependent spouse in an economic style close to which the spouse had become 
accustomed during the marriage.”56  Other courts treat alimony as a form of 
recompense for the more dependent spouse=s nonmonetary contributions to the 
                                                                
52Courts sometimes make awards of alimony pendente lite:  temporary awards to meet one 
spouse=s living expenses during the pendency of the divorce proceedings.  See GREGORY, ET 
AL., supra note 50, at 297-98.  We shall not be discussing such awards on this occasion.  
Rather, we shall be concerned only with awards of so-called “permanent alimony,” which may 
or may not actually be permanent but which nonetheless are intended to last for an extended 
time. 
53Although alimony generally consists of a series of periodic payments, many states 
authorize courts to make “lump sum” alimony awards as well.  See, e.g., Winokur v. Winokur, 
365 S.E.2d 94 (Ga. 1988); Washburn v. Washburn, 677 P.2d 152 (Wash. 1984).  Lump sum 
awards may be particularly desirable where the divorce is acrimonious and the dependent 
spouse is loath to rely on the other spouse=s steady compliance.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of 
Goodwin, 606 N.W.2d 315 (Iowa 2000). 
54Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1989).  The popular 
media often portray alimony as a routine outcome in divorce, available to any woman who 
asks for it.  Lenore J. Weitzman & Ruth B. Dixon, The Alimony Myth: Does No-Fault Divorce 
Make a Difference?, 14 FAM. L.Q. 141, 142-43 (1980).  In fact, however, alimony awards, 
though hardly rare, are more the exception than the rule; somewhere between 15 and 25% of 
divorced women get them.  See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 36, ' 5.04, reporter=s notes, cmt. 
a, and the sources cited therein.  Some studies have suggested even lower figures.  See 
Reynolds, supra note 33 at 843 n.79; see also Jeffrey Evans Stake, Mandatory Planning for 
Divorce, 45 VAND. L. REV. 397, 401 (1992). 
55For example, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held it proper for a trial court to 
award alimony as a substitute for the equitable distribution of property.  In re Jones, 768 A.2d 
1042 (N.H. 2001).  The plaintiff was entitled, under the state=s principles of equitable 
distribution, to one-half of the defendant=s business, but the trial court awarded the entire 
business to defendant in order to avoid future conflicts between the parties.  And then to 
compensate the plaintiff for this unequal division of marital property, it awarded her additional 
alimony; indeed, more alimony than she had asked for.  Id. at 1045-46.  In Illinois, on the 
other hand, “an award of maintenance in lieu of property is improper” (though an award of 
property in lieu maintenance is proper).  In re Marriage of Brackett, 722 N.E.2d 287, 295 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1999). 
56595 N.E.2d 792, 793 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992); accord Heim v. Heim, 763 P.2d 678, 683 
(Nev. 1988). 
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family.57  And still others employ alimony as a transitional, rehabilitative tool 
designed to maintain the more dependent spouse until he or she can become 
self-supporting.58  Variation among courts also exists as to the significance of marital 
fault in the determination of alimony awards.59
The American Law Institute, which rejects fault as a factor in alimony 
determinations,60 regards as the doctrinal foundation for alimony awards the 
equitable allocation, between the spouses, of the “financial losses that arise at the 
dissolution of [the] marriage.”61  Among the financial losses that the Institute 
enumerates, however, are losses that would sound quite familiar to divorce courts 
already: e.g., “the loss [in a marriage of significant duration] in living standard 
experienced at dissolution by the spouse who has less wealth or earning capacity”62 
and “[t]he loss either spouse incurs when the marriage is dissolved before that spouse 
realizes a fair return from his or her investment in the other spouse=s earning 
capacity.”63
D.  The Incentives Behind Prenuptial Agreements 
Prenuptial agreements are prevalent and fashionable and likely to become even 
more so.  While statistics in this particular context are necessarily conjectural,64 one 
author writing in the mid-1990s reported that approximately 5% of married couples 
(some 50,000 couples) each year execute prenuptial agreements, up from only 1% in 
the mid-1970s.65  Of course, one obvious explanation for this five-fold increase is 
that prenuptial agreements were more regularly enforced in the 1990s than in the 
1970s.  But this change in the enforceability rate can serve as only a partial 
explanation; parties with greater bargaining power frequently insert provisions in a 
contract that they know are unenforceable in the hope that the weaker party, ignorant 
of the law and more easily intimidated, will nonetheless presume she is bound by 
them.  We must look elsewhere for explanations. 
The American divorce rate is high,66 and so is popular awareness of that high 
rate.  The news media constantly remind us of the dispiriting fact that 50% of all 
                                                                
57See, e.g., McNamara v. McNamara, 443 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Klein 
v. Klein, 555 A.2d 382, 387 (Vt. 1988). 
58See Hopfer v. Hopfer, 757 A.2d 673 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000); Pfohl v. Pfohl, 345 So. 2d 
371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).  See generally GREGORY ET AL., supra note 50, at 299-301. 
59See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 36, at ch. 1, topic 2, reporter=s notes. 
60Id. ' 5.02(2). 
61Id. ' 5.02(1). 
62Id. ' 5.03(2)(a). 
63Id. ' 5.03(3)(a). 
64See Bix, supra note 5, at 160. “[E]mpirical work on attitudes and practices [relating to 
prenuptial agreements] is fairly sparse.”  Id.  
65See Gary Belsky, Living by the Rules, MONEY, May 1996, at 102. 
66Indeed, they are the highest in the industrialized world. Hodder, supra note 9, at 42. 
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American marriages end in divorce.67  Indeed, based on current data, “25-year-olds 
marrying for the first time . . . face a 52.5 percent chance overall that their marriage 
will end in divorce.”68  In 1972, only 17% of American adults who had ever been 
married had once (or more often) gone though a divorce; by 1998, that figure had 
risen to 33%.69  Obviously, high divorce rates and widespread awareness of divorce 
generate greater interest, especially among persons of wealth, in minimizing 
divorce=s adverse financial consequences.  Even if the enforceability of prenuptial 
agreements were less certain than it is today, the high incidence of divorce would 
still convince matrimonial attorneys of the agreements= desirability:  “If I were to tell 
you that there=s a disease out there that affects 50% of the body politic and that 
there=s a vaccine that is only 60% effective, of course you would still take the 
vaccine.”70
High divorce rates mean high second-marriage rates, and the divorce rate for 
second marriages is even higher than for first marriages:  60% instead of 50.71  It 
should come as no surprise, then, that prenuptial agreements are more common for 
second marriages than for first marriages.72  And they are more common not only 
because of the higher divorce rate but also because second marriages occur at a later 
chronological age than first marriages:  that is, at an age when one or both spouses 
are likely to have accumulated more premarital wealth in need of protection.73  
Indeed, inasmuch as Americans postpone even their first marriages to a later (and 
                                                                
67“[T]he cold fact is that approximately one in every two marriages in the United States 
will end in divorce.”  Bix, supra note 5, at 194 (citing Lynn A. Baker, Promulgating the 
Marriage Contract, 23 MICH. J.L. REFORM 217, 226 & n.34, 245 & n. 101 (1990)); see also 
Stake, supra note 54, at 398 n.4 (“Based on the marriages within the last 15 years, the odds of 
divorce are about one out of two.”).  For some recent rethinking of these data, see Dan Hurley, 
Divorce Rate:  It=s Not as High as You Think, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2005, at D7. 
68 Hodder, supra note 9, at 42.  “About 50 percent of first marriages for men under age 
forty-five may end in divorce, and between 44 and 52 percent [of first marriages for women 
under age forty-five] may end in divorce . . . .”  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP=T OF 
COMMERCE, NUMBER, TIMING, AND DURATION OF MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES:  1996, at 18, 
available at http://www.sipp.census.gov/sipp/p70s/p70-80.pdf. 
69SMITH, supra note 12, at 22. 
70William G. Flanagan & David Stix, Share and Share Unalike, FORBES, June 10, 1991, at 
116, 118 (quoting matrimonial lawyer Raoul Felder). 
71Ilyce R. Glink, Nuptial Saga: “48 Hours of Marriage, For Better For Worse,” =CHI. 
TRIB., May 19, 1991, ' 6 (Womanews), at 2. 
72See Allison A. Marston, Note, Planning for Love:  The Politics of Prenuptial 
Agreements, 49 STAN. L. REV. 887, 891 (1997) (citing Allison A. Page, Note, Premarital 
Consent to Waiver of Spousal Pension Benefits:  A Proposal to Equalize Prenuptial “I Do” 
and Postnuptial “I Do,” 47 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 157, 162 (1995) (“[A]n 
estimated 20 percent of remarriages feature a prenuptial agreement.”)). 
73Researchers have found that if one or both spouses have been married before, their 
marriage is more likely to be “age-discrepant” than if the marriage were the first for each.  
Brod, supra note 7, at 244.  The older and more economically powerful member of an age-
discrepant couple is likely to be particularly anxious to insulate property from marital claims. 
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presumably wealthier) age than before, prenuptial agreements are becoming more 
popular for first-timers as well.74
Shifts in judicial preferences also account for the increasing popularity of 
prenuptial agreements.  The 1960s marked the beginning of a judicial trend away 
from grants of alimony in favor of grants of property. 
The ethos of increased independence for persons wanting to be free of 
their spouse, the elimination of fault as a legally relevant consideration in 
divorce, the excision of permanence from the concept of marriage, the 
granting of freedom to remarry, and the replacement of assumed female 
dependency with assumptions of equality and autonomy may have 
discouraged already reluctant judges from granting alimony.75
And property awards have one important characteristic that alimony awards do not, a 
characteristic that reformers considered a blessing but that economically dominant 
spouses consider a bane:  immutability.  Alimony awards, even if they are classified 
as “permanent alimony,” are always subject to modification in the event of post-
adjudication changes in circumstances,76 whereas outright awards of property are not 
subject to such modification.77  Consequently, the shift from alimony to property 
awards creates an added incentive for the wealthier spouse to insist on a prenuptial 
agreement. 
The widespread publicity accorded large marital awards in high-profile divorces 
also helps to explain the increasing appeal of prenuptial agreements.78  When Jack 
Welch, retired CEO of General Electric, divorced his wife Jane after his much-
publicized affair with the editor of Harvard Business Review, his net worth was 
about $900 million, and Jane, there being no enforceable prenuptial agreement in 
place, received $500 million of it in the divorce settlement.79  NASCAR driver Jeff 
Gordon divorced his wife after seven years of marriage, and she received as a 
consequence some $17 million of his $50 million net worth.80
                                                                
74In 2000, the median age of men at the time of their first marriage was 26.8, up from 24.7 
in 1980 and 22.8 in 1960.  For women, the 2000 figure was 25.1, up from 22.0 in 1980 and 
20.3 in 1960.  WORLD ALMANAC EDUC. GROUP, WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 2003, 
at 77 (2003); see Symposium, Developments in the LawCThe Law of Marriage and Family, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 1996, 2075 (2003) [hereinafter Developments]. 
75 Stake, supra note 54, at 401. 
76 GREGORY ET AL., supra note 50, at 304-12. 
77But see Reynolds, supra note 33, at 834 n.34 (citing two New York cases in which 
courts suggested that their equitable distribution awards might be subject to future 
modification). 
78See Developments, supra note 74, at 2075 n.7. 
79Braden Keil, A Beacon for Welch, N.Y. POST, July 3, 2004, at NaN; see also Margaret 
Littman, Is a Prenup Expiration Date an Ex-Wife=s Best Revenge?, CHI. TRIB., March 27, 
2002, at C1 (noting that the couple originally had signed a prenuptial agreement, but by the 
agreement=s own terms it had expired ten years after they were married, and that tenth 
anniversary occurred thirteen years before the divorce).   
80Ed Hinton, Gordon=s Engine Purring, With Personal Problems Behind Him, NASCAR=S 
Wonder Boy Re-Emerges as a Dominant Driver, CHI. TRIB., July 11, 2004, at C13; Don 
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Also well-publicized at this time were the enormous savings that premarital 
agreements generated for wealthy spouses.  Professional baseball star Barry Bonds 
was able, because of a prenuptial agreement, to walk away from a six-year marriage 
(during which his annual income had increased some 75-fold) obliged to pay merely 
$20,000 per month in child support and $10,000 per month in alimony for about four 
and a half years, instead of having to allot half of his $40 million fortune to his ex-
wife.81  And a prenuptial agreement allowed Boston construction magnate M. Joseph 
DeMatteo to keep 99% of his $112 million net worth upon divorce.82
III.  THE EVOLUTION IN THE ENFORCEABILITY OF PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS 
In less than 30 years, American courts shifted from routinely rejecting divorce-
focused prenuptial agreements to routinely enforcing them.83  Before the 1970s, 
American courts refused enforcement, on the ground that enforcement would tend to 
undermine marital stability.84  This belief that prenuptial agreements promote divorce 
may strike us today as quaintly Victorian, but to me it is naive to believe otherwise.  
Of course they promote divorce.  If a married man knows that a divorce will cost him 
half his net worth, he will be less inclined to walk away from the marriage than if he 
knows that a premarital contract will keep those costs to a minimum.85  And even 
apart from these financial considerations, prenuptial agreements may be said to 
promote divorce by making the unthinkable thinkable: 
 
                                                           
Coble, Lovers= Lane, It=s Not.  Still, Many Drivers Race into Romance, FLA. TIMES-UNION, 
Feb. 14, 2004, at C1. 
81In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815 (Cal. 2000); National League, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, Aug. 27, 2000, at 24B; Pro Basketball:  No Big Deal for Four Teams, COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH (OHIO), Aug. 22, 2000, at 2F. 
82DeMatteo v. DeMatteo, 762 N.E.2d 797 (Mass. 2002); Bruce Mohl, On To-Do Lists:  
Rehearsal for Divorce Many Advise Prenups While Love Is in the Air, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 
21, 2003, at H6; Kathleen Burge, SJC Upholds Validity of Prenuptial Agreement, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Feb. 9, 2002, at A1. 
83Bernstein, supra note 17, at 138 (citing Pendleton v. Fireman, 5 P.3d 839, 845-46 (Cal. 
2000)). 
84E.g., Gallemore v. Gallemore, 114 So. 371 (Fla. 1927); Scherba v. Scherba, 65 N.W.2d 
758 (Mich. 1954); Fricke v. Fricke, 42 N.W.2d 500 (Wis. 1950). 
85See Fincham v. Fincham, 165 P.2d 209, 213 (Kan. 1946) (“Did the provision for 
settlement, in case of separation, invite and encourage a separation as a source of pecuniary 
profit to the husband?  Manifestly it did.  The result is that quite naturally he might be inclined 
to be less considerate of his marital duties and obligations.  He might even become grossly 
abusive, completely intolerable and deliberately bring about a separation in the contractual 
assurance that irrespective of the cause of separation he could effectively relieve himself of all 
marital and contractual obligations by the payment of $2,000, a rather insignificant sum in 
comparison with his financial worth of approximately $160,000.”); see also Carlin Flora, Let=s 
Make a Deal: Does a Prenuptial Agreement Sow the Seeds of Divorce or Provide a Crash 
Course in Conflict Resolution?, 37 PSYCH. TODAY, Nov. 1, 2004, at 54 (quoting attorney Sam 
Margulies:  “Without a prenup, the stronger party has got to engage in more compromise in 
the course of the marriage.  But with a prenup, he can just say, ‘Honey, if you don’t like it B 
leave.’”); John F. Schaefer, Why Michigan Should Divorce Antenuptial Agreements from 
Divorce Cases, 76 MICH. BUS. L.J. 1076, 1076 (1997). 
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[O]ne criterion of being in love is the belief that it—both the feeling and 
the relationship underlying it—will go on forever.  If one thinks that it 
will end in a few weeks—or even a few years—then one is not in love.  At 
the same time, the cold fact is that approximately one in every two 
marriages in the United States will end in divorce.  These facts sit 
uneasily together; people know divorce is not rare, but keeping a 
pragmatic eye on things—here, on the likelihood of failure—seems just 
the type of attitude that may make failure more likely.86
Yet the earliest American courts to enforce divorce-focused prenuptial agreements 
still felt compelled to include in their opinions the fruitless caveat that a prenuptial 
agreement would not be enforced if the particular agreement could be shown to have 
facilitated or promoted the particular divorce.87  The inclusion of this caveat 
demonstrates that the shift in judicial attitudes from treating prenuptial agreements as 
unenforceable per se to treating them as presumptively enforceable reflected not a 
change of opinion as to whether prenuptial agreements encourage divorce, but rather 
a change of opinion as to the nature of divorce and marriage. 
Back when prenuptial agreements were unenforceable, marriage was regarded as 
a state-regulated public status:  not a bilateral alliance, but a trilateral one involving 
the two spouses and the state.88  The state=s interest lay in preserving the institution 
of marriage and in maintaining the financial security of divorced persons.89  And 
because the state was a party to every marriage, it could conceivably assert interests 
in conflict with those asserted by the two spouses.  “Since marriage is of vital 
interest to society and the state, it has frequently been said that in every divorce suit 
the state is a third party whose interests take precedence over the private interests of 
the spouses.”90  In other words, a court could not grant a divorce merely because the 
spouses wanted one;91 the state had to be agreeable as well. 
When the contracting parties have entered into the married state, they 
have not so much entered into a contract as into a new relation, the rights, 
duties and obligations of which rest, not upon their agreement, but upon 
the general law of the State, statutory or common, which defines and 
prescribes those rights, duties and obligations.  They are of law, not of 
                                                                
86 Bix, supra note 5, at 194-95 (footnotes omitted). 
87In re Marriage of Dawley, 551 P.2d 323, 333 (Cal. 1976); Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 
381, 385 (Fla. 1970), rev=d on other grounds, 257 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1972). 
88See, e.g., Roberts v. Roberts, 185 P.2d 381, 385 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947); Anonymous v. 
Anonymous, 62 N.Y.S.2d 130, 133 (Sup. Ct. 1946). 
89Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044, 1048 (Alaska 1987).  Of special concern was the 
possibility that the poorer of the two spouses, typically the wife, would, in the absence of an 
adequate divorce settlement, have to be supported by the state. 
90 Posner, 233 So. 2d at 383; accord Winans v. Winans, 26 N.E. 293, 295 (N.Y. 1891) (“A 
divorce suit, while on its face a mere controversy between private parties of record, is as truly 
viewed, a triangular proceeding sui generis, wherein the public or government occupies, in 
effect, the position of third party.  And while this third party is not specially represented by 
counsel, it is for this purpose to be represented and protected by the judges.”). 
91Underwood v. Underwood, 12 Fla. 434, 443 (1868). 
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contract.  It was of contract that the relation should be established, but, 
being established, the power of the parties, as to their extent or duration, is 
at an end.  Their rights under it are determined by the will of the sovereign 
as evidenced by law. . . . It is a relation for life; and the parties cannot 
terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they may 
make.92
And similarly, a prenuptial contract between prospective spouses could not be 
allowed to alter the state=s rules for property-apportionment inasmuch as the state 
was not a party to the prenuptial contract.  Thus, the judicial shift from rejecting 
prenuptial agreements to enforcing them was profoundly linked to the public shift 
from fault-based divorce to no-fault divorce.93  Indeed the decade that marked the 
so-called no-fault revolution, the 1970s, also marked the beginning of the prenuptial 
agreement revolution. 
Two developments spurred the no-fault revolution.  The first was the mounting 
dissatisfaction with, even revulsion at, the collusive and migratory games that the 
fault-based system forced upon spouses intent on divorce.  In the days when divorce 
statutes required marital “fault” like adultery, desertion, or physical or mental 
cruelty,94 and only the “innocent” spouse had standing to commence a divorce 
action,95 couples who shared a desire for divorce but could provide no genuine 
evidence of statutory misconduct would manufacture whatever evidence was 
required.96  Indeed, the State of New York, which once allowed divorce only for 
adultery,97 was notorious for granting divorces on the basis of obviously staged 
                                                                
92Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480, 483 (1863). 
93See, e.g., McAlpine v. McAlpine, 679 So. 2d 85, 93 (La. 1996).   
[W]ith the advent of no-fault divorce and the changes in society that such laws 
represent, public policy has changed[,] and the traditional rule that prenuptial waivers 
of permanent alimony were void ab initio has given way to the more realistic view that 
such agreements are valid and enforceable under certain conditions. 
Id. at 93. 
94These statutory fault grounds were often interpreted quite strictly.  For example, a New 
Jersey court held that sexual conduct with a third party did not amount to adultery unless the 
sexual conduct included coitus.  W. v. W., 226 A.2d 860, 862 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967); 
see also Laura Bradford, Note, The Counterrevolution:  A Critique of Recent Proposals to 
Reform No-Fault Divorce, 49 STAN. L. REV. 607, 610 (1997). 
95See Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Comment, Fault:  A Viable Means of Re-Injecting 
Responsibility in Marital Relations, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 605, 607 (1996). 
96See, e.g., Symposium, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture:  An Overview of 
Women=s Rights and Family Law in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88 CAL. 
L. REV. 2017, 2051 (2000).  So familiar in popular culture were these machinations that Cole 
Porter could enjoy considerable success with a 1932 musical comedy, The Gay Divorce, about 
a woman embarking on a collusive divorce, a hired corespondent, and a man (played by Fred 
Astaire) whom she mistakes for the hired corespondent.  DAVID EWEN, NEW COMPLETE BOOK 
OF THE AMERICAN MUSICAL THEATER 163-64 (1970). 
97Indeed, New York is one of the few states that still cling to a fault-only divorce system, 
although the list of grounds now includes more than just adultery.  See Leslie Eaton, A New 
Push to Loosen New York=s Divorce Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2004, at 1. 
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“discoveries” of one spouse flagrante delicto with a third party,98 and divorce trials 
in New York at the time rarely lasted even fifteen minutes.99
If the couple hadn’t the stomach for manufactured melodrama, they might have 
relied on temporary migration to achieve their goal.  The couple needed first to find 
an obliging state with a short residency requirement as well as a more lenient list of 
possible grounds for divorce than the state where the couple lived.  A judgment of 
divorce rendered by one state is entitled to Full Faith and Credit by other states only 
if the forum state had jurisdiction to grant the divorce,100 but, as a federal 
constitutional matter, the mere establishment of domicile in the forum state by the 
plaintiff spouse suffices to confer such jurisdiction.101   Most states, however, impose 
by statute an additional jurisdictional requirement beyond that necessary to satisfy 
the federal “domicile” standard:  They require the plaintiff spouse to have resided in 
the state for a minimum statutory period.102  Nevada, with its liberal grounds for 
divorce and its residency requirement of only six weeks,103 became “the hardy 
perennial of the quickie-divorce states.”104  But the migratory approach, like the 
                                                                
98See Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. 
L. REV. 9, 16 n.17 (1990); see also Eaton, supra note 97. (“Many judges detest the he-said, 
she-said of fault trials, and some pressure the couple into agreeing to ‘constructive 
abandonment,’ in which one of the parties testifies that his or her spouse refused to have sex 
for a year, despite repeated requests, even if it is not true.”) (emphasis added). 
99Richard H. Wels, New York:  The Poor Man=s Reno, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 303, 318 (1950); 
see also Difonzo, supra note 2, at 897 (“According to Herma Hill Kay, a leading figure in the 
no-fault movement, by the 1960s ‘it was impossible to make divorce easier in California than 
it already was.’  In typical ten-minute court hearings, ninety-five percent of California divorce 
complainants recited accounts of their spouses’ ‘extreme cruelty’ destroying their marriage.  
This statutory requirement could be met by the wife=s simple assertion that her husband was 
‘cold and indifferent,’ which caused her to become ‘nervous and upset.’”) (footnotes omitted). 
100Williams v. North Carolina [II], 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945). 
101Williams v. North Carolina [I], 317 U.S. 287, 298-99 (1942). 
102See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 395 (1975).  The federal Constitution imposes 
no durational requirement on the establishment of domicile.  An individual can make a state 
her domicile instantly, simply by moving and residing there with the intention of remaining 
there indefinitely.  15 MOORE=S FEDERAL PRACTICE  ¶ 102.34 to .35 (3d ed. 2005). 
103Ernest G. Lorenzen, Extraterritorial Divorce B Williams v. North Carolina II, 54 YALE 
L.J. 799, 801 (1945).  Nevada=s six-week rule was so notorious that Lorenz Hart referred to it 
obliquely in his song lyrics for the 1938 Rodgers and Hart musical comedy The Boys from 
Syracuse, a musical version of Shakespeare=s Comedy of Errors.  In the first act of the show, 
which takes place in the Greek-controlled city of Syracuse, a dissatisfied wife sings to her 
husband: 
Listen to your lady who speaks.  
This affair has run its course.  
I'll reside in Athens six weeks  
While I get me a divorce. 
Richard Rodgers & Lorenz Hart, The Boys From Syracuse, available at http://www. 
allthelyrics.com. 
104Walter Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REV. 32, 38 n.22 
(1966). 
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collusive approach, required a bit of perjury, inasmuch as the Nevada plaintiff, in 
order to establish the requisite domicile, had to swear that she intended to remain in 
Nevada indefinitely and had no plans to return to her previous domicile. 
That parties were willing to perjure themselves to obtain divorces demonstrates 
the width of the gap between the norms reflected in the divorce statutes and the 
prevailing norms of society at large.105  And herein lay the second development that 
spurred the no-fault revolution:  the marked change in social attitudes towards 
marriage and divorce. 
The “fault” regime, which dominated American divorce law as soon as there was 
any American divorce law, viewed marital relations as being founded on moral 
duties of permanent fidelity and responsibility; consequently, those marital bonds 
could be severed only if one spouse so seriously breached his moral obligations to 
the other as to forfeit any right to demand fulfillment of duty in return.106  As long as 
society understood marriage in that way, divorce necessarily stigmatized both 
parties:  one as a dishonorable villain, the other as a pathetic victim.  But as society, 
perhaps with a little help from psychology,107 came to see marital breakdown as a 
complex process for which the spouses shared responsibility,108 any divorce system 
that stigmatized the participants had to be rejected.  And rejected it was. 
The no-fault regime emerged when Americans= traditional regard for individual 
autonomy and self-realization—and, by extension, contractual freedom—came to 
color its view of marriage. 
[M]arriage has become an “exchange” relationship.  Husband and wife are 
equal, autonomous parties, each pursuing emotional fulfillment through 
marriage.  The relationship is sustained as long as it produces “returns” 
for each [spouse].109
And the spouses themselves, not the state, are in the best position to judge the 
marriage=s continued ability to generate those “returns.”  Indeed, under a no-fault 
regime, either spouse acting alone can bring about a dissolution of the marriage.110
                                                                
105See Scott, supra note 98, at 9; see also Bradford, supra note 94, at 611 (“In the 1960s, 
ninety percent of divorces on fault ground were granted without contest.”). 
106See Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family 
Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1809 (1985). 
107See id. at 1845-63. 
108See Scott, supra note 98, at 16 (“Under the modern view, the specific behavior that 
constituted legal fault was usually only a small part of a story of shared responsibility for the 
failure of the marriage.”). 
109Id. at 21. 
110See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW: AMERICAN 
FAILURES, EUROPEAN CHALLENGES 81 (1987) (“[T]he virtually universal understanding . . . is 
that the breakdown of a marriage is irretrievable if one spouse says it is.”).  A survey of 
Nebraska district court judges undertaken five years after Nebraska amended its divorce law to 
become a no-fault state “failed to reveal a single instance [out of some 10,000 divorce cases] 
in which it could be said with certainty that a divorce which was desired by even one of the 
spouses was ultimately refused.”  Alan H. Frank, John J. Berman, & Stanley F. Mazur-Hart, 
No Fault Divorce and the Divorce Rate:  The Nebraska Experience—An Interrupted Time 
Series Analysis and Commentary 58 NEB. L. REV. 1, 66 (1978). 
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The State of New Mexico may have begun the no-fault revolution—albeit, 
quietly—in 1933 by adding the word “incompatibility” to its statutory list of grounds 
for divorce.111  But inasmuch as New Mexico retained the traditional fault-based 
grounds in its amended statute, New Mexico courts sometimes clung to the notion 
that divorce could not always be grounded on only one spouse=s wish.  In Clark v. 
Clark,112 for example, where a husband sued for divorce on incompatibility grounds 
and the wife pleaded the husband=s adultery in response, the court held that it would 
“shock” the conscience to grant the husband=s petition in circumstances that would 
make the divorce a reward for bad behavior.113  The no-fault revolution as we know 
it today did not truly begin until California, in 1969, not only added a no-fault 
ground (irreconcilable differences) to its list of divorce grounds but also abolished 
the rest of the list.114  Some 15 states have followed California=s lead and abolished 
all fault-based grounds for divorce.115  Another 32 states, some before 1969 (like 
New Mexico) and some since, have added a no-fault ground to their list but retained 
the traditional fault grounds.116  But even in these 32 states, the cultural change 
precipitated by California=s repeal of all fault-based grounds became so powerful as 
to eviscerate the once-prevalent fault grounds.  Indeed, “fault-based petitions [were] 
often resolve[d] into no-fault divorce decrees.”117
The state=s role in structuring the economic settlement between divorcing spouses 
“was premised on the state=s interest in enforcing the terms of the traditional 
marriage contract.”118  Consequently, once the no-fault revolution effectively 
eliminated the state=s power to interfere with a couple=s intention to divorce, it was 
but a small step to eliminate (or, at least, reduce) the state=s power to interfere with a 
divorce-bound couple=s premarital settlement of their economic obligations.  And, 
indeed, the case usually cited as the first American case to uphold the enforceability 
                                                                
1111933  N.M.  Laws 54; see also James Herbie Difonzo, Alternatives to Marital Fault:  
Legislative and Judicial Experiments in Cultural Change, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 29 (1977). 
112225 P.2d 147 (N.M. 1950). 
113Id. at 149.  The word “reward” is mine, not the court=s. 
114See Family Law Act of 1969, ch. 1608, ' 4506, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3314, 3324 (now 
codified at CAL. FAM. CODE. ' 2310 (West 2004)).  “Incurable insanity” is the one remaining 
alternative ground.  The California legislature seems to have enacted no-fault in the hope that 
family court judges would not simply accept at face value the parties’ claims of irreconcilable 
differences but rather, now that they were freed from the burden of umpiring a battle, would 
evaluate the parties claims and assist in repairing the broken marriage.  See In re Marriage of 
McKim, 493 P.2d 868, 871 (Cal. 1972).  As things have turned out, though, courts have 
accepted the parties’ claims at face value.  Writing less than a decade after California adopted 
the “irreconcilable differences” standard, one scholar noted that not a single divorce petition 
had since been denied for failure to establish that such differences existed.  See RIANE T. 
EISLER, DISSOLUTION:  NO-FAULT DIVORCE, MARRIAGE, AND THE FUTURE OF WOMEN 10 
(1977). 
115See Bradford, supra note 94, at 614. 
116See Difonzo, supra note 3, at 908 n.180. 
117Id. 
118Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1474 (1992). 
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of prenuptial agreements, Posner v. Posner,119 relied in part on the accelerating 
acceptance of no-fault divorce.120
In the post-Posner era, some courts have gone quite far in their willingness to 
enforce prenuptial agreements.  One of the most extreme—indeed, notorious—
examples of such judicial deference to private contractual aims is the 1990 
Pennsylvania case Simeone v. Simeone,121 which treated prenuptial agreements as if 
they were ordinary business contracts: 
[In the absence of actual fraud or duress,] contracting parties are normally 
bound by their agreements, without regard to whether the terms thereof 
were read and fully understood and irrespective of whether the agreements 
embodied reasonable or good bargains . . . . Parties [to a prenuptial 
agreement] would not have entered such agreements, and, indeed, might 
not have entered their marriages, if they did not expect their agreements to 
be strictly enforced.122
To apply a less deferential standard in the case of prenuptial agreements, said the 
court, would be a patronizing throwback to an age when “[p]aternalistic 
presumptions and protections [sheltered] women from the inferiorities and 
incapacities which they were perceived as having.”123
Most courts today, however, although they willingly enforce prenuptial 
agreements, recognize that these are not ordinary business contracts, but this 
recognition has nothing to do with a desire to avoid the appearance of condescension 
to women.  Rather, this recognition proceeds from an awareness of the special 
circumstances surrounding the execution of a prenuptial agreement.  First, the parties 
to a prenuptial agreement do not bargain at arms= length; “[t]heir relationship is one 
of mutual confidence and trust which calls for the exercise of good faith, candor and 
sincerity in all matters bearing upon the proposed agreement.”124  Second, the parties 
entering into a prenuptial agreement do so at a time when, through optimism or 
careless rapture, they expect the agreement never to apply, or at least not to apply 
until many years in the future, and therefore they cannot capably assess at the time of 
                                                                
119233 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1970), rev’d on other grounds, 257 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1972).  As to 
Posner’s status as the first case to depart from the per se rule of unenforceability, see 
Developments, supra note 73, at 2078; Difonzo, supra note 3, at 938. 
120233 So. 2d at 384; see also ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 36, ' 7.01 cmt. a (“The 
nationwide abandonment of traditional fault divorce since the 1970s eliminated [the] absolute 
barrier to premarital agreements.”). 
121581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990).  When the agreement was signed, the prospective husband 
was a neurosurgeon and the prospective wife an unemployed nurse.  The bride was presented 
with the contract on the eve of the wedding, and she signed it without the benefit of counsel.  
Id. at 163. 
122Id. at 165, 166. 
123Id. at 165. 
124Friedlander v. Friedlander, 494 P.2d 208, 213 (Wash. 1972). 
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contracting the impact that the contract=s terms are likely to have on them when its 
enforcement is ultimately sought.125
But how can courts, in deciding whether to enforce a prenuptial agreement, 
balance this concern about the peculiarity of premarital bargains against their general 
regard for contractual autonomy and their desire to allow private individuals to forge 
relations on their own terms?  The traditional method of balance—at least in 
theory—was for courts to borrow from ordinary contract law the requirements of 
voluntariness and conscionability but then, as a reflection of “the longstanding belief 
that parties to be married are in a relationship of trust,”126 to impose on the parties an 
additional, extraordinary requirement of disclosure.127  The Uniform Premarital 
Agreement Act (UPAA),128 promulgated in 1983 and now effective in 26 states,129 
tips the balance scales very far in favor of enforcement and does so by 
simultaneously weakening the disclosure requirement and all but extinguishing the 
conscionability requirement. 
The UPAA borrows from traditional contract law the requirement of 
voluntariness; under the Act a premarital agreement may not be enforced against a 
party thereto if she proves that she “did not execute the agreement voluntarily.”130  
But the Act departs from traditional contract law principles by permitting the 
contract to be enforced even if it is unconscionable, unless the party seeking to avoid 
enforcement on that ground can also prove that she did not have actual or even 
constructive knowledge of the other party=s property or financial obligations and that 
she did not expressly waive, in writing, the right to receive such information.131  
                                                                
125ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 36, ' 7.02 cmt. c.  See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, 
The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995). 
126Developments, supra note 74,  at 2081. 
127“Parties to commercial agreements are not ordinarily bound to make affirmative 
disclosures of information in their possession that gives them a bargaining advantage, so long 
as they do not affirmatively misrepresent or conceal the truth.”  ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 
35, at ' 7.04 cmt. g. 
128UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, 9C U.L.A. 35 (2001).  
129Judith T. Younger, Antenuptial Agreements, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 697, 716-17 
(2001). 
130UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT ' 6(a)(1), 9C U.L.A. 48 (2001).  The UPAA does 
not define “voluntarily,” but presumably evidence of duress or undue influence would 
undermine any inference of voluntariness.  See Dennis I. Belcher & Laura O. Pomeroy, A 
Practitioner=s Guide for Negotiating, Drafting and Enforcing Premarital Agreements, 37 
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1, 11 (2002). 
131UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT ' 6, 9C U.L.A. 48-49 (2001). 
(a)A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is 
sought proves that: 
(2)The agreement was unconscionable when it was executed and, before execution of 
the agreement, that party: 
(i) was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or financial 
obligations of the other party; 
(ii) did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to disclosure of the 
property or financial obligations of the other party beyond the disclosure provided; and 
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Thus, as long as a prospective husband fully discloses all his assets or the 
prospective wife has constructive knowledge of his assets, even an unconscionable 
prenuptial agreement will be enforced against a wife who voluntarily signs.  
Furthermore, unconscionability—an issue of law, not of fact132—is to be determined 
as of the time the agreement is entered into, not at the time enforcement is sought.  
“[S]ubstantive unfairness at the time of enforcement is no longer a proper basis for 
judicial invalidation,”133 even if the increase in the husband=s wealth during the 
marriage was largely attributable to the wife=s efforts.134
The UPAA=s somewhat unbalanced balancing test does succeed in realizing one 
of the Commissioners= stated goals:  removing from the enforcement landscape the 
“substantial uncertainty as to the [validity] of all, or a portion, of the provisions of 
these agreements and [the] significant lack of uniformity of treatment of these 
agreements among the states.”135  But the UPAA=s method of achieving certainty and 
uniformity sacrifices “virtually all principles that have been created by the common 
law to prevent the enforcement of unfair agreements.”136  My proposal of universal 
unenforceability, without requiring such sacrifices, still offers the certainty and 
uniformity that the Commissioners sought. 
                                                           
(iii) did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate knowledge of the 
property or financial obligations of the other party. 
Id. (emphasis added).  Some states, when they adopted the UPAA, altered the Commissioners= 
language to make unconscionability a sturdier ground for objection.  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ' 46b-36g(a)(2) (2004) (proof of unconscionability at the time of execution or at the 
time when enforcement is sought suffices to prevent enforcement, even where full disclosure 
of assets was made); IOWA CODE ' 596.8(2) (2003) (proof of unconscionability at the time of 
execution suffices to prevent enforcement, even where full disclosure of assets was made).  
Observe that the language of § 6 effectively assigns to the party seeking to avoid enforcement 
(typically the wife) the burden of proving that the agreement fails to satisfy the legal standard 
of voluntariness and conscionability.  Indeed, some states that have adopted the UPAA require 
that she meet that burden “by clear and convincing evidence.”  See, e.g.,  N.J. STAT. ' 37:2-38 
(2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS ' 15-17-6(b) (2004).  Even some states that have not adopted the 
UPAA likewise assign the burden, by statute or by judicial decision, to the party seeking to 
avoid enforcement.  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ' 519.11, Subd. 5 (2004); In re Estate of Benker, 
296 N.W.2d 167, 169 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (a “death-focused” prenuptial agreement). Some 
other non-UPAA states assign the burden to the party seeking enforcement.  Ex parte 
Williams, 617 So. 2d 1032, 1034 (Ala. 1992). 
132UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, ' 6(c), 9C U.L.A. 49 (2001). 
133Developments, supra note 74, at 2081. 
134The UPAA does permit a court to disregard a prenuptial provision purporting to reduce 
or eliminate the challenging spouse’s rights to spousal support if the enforcement of the 
provision would render the spouse eligible for public assistance at the time of separation or 
dissolution.  UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT ' 6(b), 9C U.L.A. 49 (2001). 
135UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, prefatory note, 9C U.L.A. 36 (1983). 
136 Brod, supra note 7, at 276. 
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IV.  WHY ENFORCING PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS IS PER SE INEQUITABLE 
Marriage is a package deal; you cannot pick and choose.  A married person 
cannot claim the shelter of the marital confidences privilege137 and yet defy his 
employer=s anti-nepotism policy against hiring the employee=s spouse.  He cannot 
claim special immigration status as a spouse138 and yet exempt himself from the 
presumption that a child born to a married couple is the offspring of the husband.139  
You cannot have “the perks without the works.”140
This equitable principle, barring an individual from simultaneously claiming the 
benefits and rejecting the burdens of a particular arrangement, enjoys a venerable 
pedigree that can be traced at least as far back as Justinian141 and takes many forms.  
The formulation favored by Scottish law “is that a man shall not be allowed to 
approbate and reprobate . . . .”142  More commonly, modern Anglo-American legal 
authorities treat the principle as a corollary of the equitable maxim:  “He who seeks 
equity must do equity,”143 while others render the maxim more specifically:  “[H]e 
who derives the advantage ought to sustain the burden.”144
Although this principle has broad application today, it was originally confined to 
the law of wills,145 where it was known as the doctrine of equitable election.  “The 
law does not permit a beneficiary in a will to accept that which benefits him and 
reject that which operates to his prejudice.”146
                                                                
137See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. ' 595.02(1)(a) (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. ' 26-1-802 
(2003). 
138See 8 U.S.C. ' 1153(d) (2000). 
139See, e.g., Gammon v. Cobb, 335 So. 2d 261, 264 (Fla. 1976) (characterizing the 
presumption as “one of the strongest rebuttable presumptions known to the law”); accord 
Feazel v. Feazel, 62 So. 2d 119, 120 (La. 1952) (“the strongest presumption known in law”). 
140See James M. Donovan, An Ethical Argument to Restrict Domestic Partnerships to 
Same-Sex Couples, 8 LAW & SEXUALITY 649, 662 (1998). 
141See J. INST. 2.20. p. 4. 
142See 2 CHARLES FISK BEACH, JR., MODERN EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE ' 1068 (1892). 
143JAMES W. EATON, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE '' 65-66 (2d ed. 1923). 
144See, e.g., Am. Car & Foundry Co. v. Smock, 93 N.E. 78, 79 (Ind. Ct. App. 1910); 
Fleming v. Taylor Fuel, Light & Power Co., 136 P. 228, 230 (Kan. 1913); Oneida County 
Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 407 N.Y.S.2d 89 (App. Div. 
1978).  And who among us can resist the Latin:  qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus?  
BLACK=S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). 
145ASHBURNER’S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 473-76 (Denis Browne ed., 2d ed. 1933); accord 
BEACH supra note 142, ' 1070 (1892). 
146Oglesby v. Springfield Marine Bank, 69 N.E.2d 269, 274 (Ill. 1946); accord Jacobs v. 
Miller, 15 N.W. 42, 45 (Mich. 1883) (“[A] person cannot claim under the instrument without 
confirming it.  He must found his claim on the whole and cannot adopt that feature or 
operation which makes in his favor and at the same time repudiate or contradict another 
feature or operation which is counter or adverse to it.”). 
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In Elmore v. Covington,147 for example, X and Y had conveyed two houses to the 
testator before testator=s death.  When testator died, his will bequeathed the two 
houses back to X and Y (plus $100 for each devisee).  X and Y alleged that they had 
conveyed the two houses to testator pursuant to a contract whereby testator had 
promised to bequeath to them 9/13 of his estate, which amounted to more than the 
value of the two houses.  A bequest of 9/13 of the estate would entitle X and Y to 
9/13 of every asset or to whichever whole assets (chosen by the court, presumably) 
had a dollar value equal to 9/13 of the estate.  But X and Y wanted to take the two 
houses whole under the will, and then receive by way of damages the amount by 
which the value of the two houses fell short of 9/13 of the estate.  The court held that 
X and Y had to elect either to accept the will (i.e., take the two houses and the $100 
but nothing else) or to sue for breach of contract (in which case they would get 9/13 
of every asset rather than the two houses whole).  The court held that X and Y could 
not simultaneously accept the benefits under the will and seek specific performance 
of a promise notwithstanding the will. 
In Lawrence v. Coffield,148 Fritz and Clara were husband and wife, and all their 
property was community property.  Fritz died first, and in his will he bequeathed a 
particular farm to Clara for life, and the remainder to tenants who had lived on the 
farm for many years.  He bequeathed the residue of the couple=s property to Clara.  
Because the farm was community property, Fritz had the right to bequeath only half 
of it; the other half belonged to Clara absolutely.  Thus, when he bequeathed to the 
tenants a remainder interest in the whole farm, he was bequeathing property that did 
not belong to him.  Some years later, Clara purported to convey to one Coffield her 
entire one-half interest in the farm plus her life estate in the other one-half (that is, 
the life estate in Fritz=s one-half that Fritz bequeathed to her in his will).  The court 
held that Clara no longer owned the “entire one-half interest” that she had purported 
to convey.  Because she had accepted and used income derived from the entire 
residue rather than just the income from her community half, Clara had in effect 
elected to accept the benefit of the will (enjoying all the residue), so she had to 
accept the burden and thereby lost all remainder interests in both portions of the 
farm. 
It is important to note that the doctrine of equitable election does not depend for 
its operation on the testator=s intention.  Even if Fritz, for example, genuinely 
believed he had the power to bequeath the entire farm—that is, even if he did not 
intend to put Clara to an election—the doctrine would still be applied and Clara 
would lose her interest in the remainder of the farm if she accepted income from 
Fritz=s one-half of the residue.149  Indeed, it would be, according to Lord Eldon, 
“against conscience” to allow her to enjoy Fritz=s property yet keep her own.150
                                                                
147172 S.W.2d 809 (Tenn. 1943). 
148468 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); accord Andrews v. Kelleher, 214 P. 1056 
(Wash. 1923). 
149See Neville Crago, Mistakes in Wills and Election in Equity, 106 LAW Q. REV. 487, 495 
(1990); see, e.g., Padbury v. Clark, 2 Macn. & G. [Macnaghten & Gordon=s English Chancery 
Reports] 298 (1850), reprinted in 42 Eng. Rep. 115. 
150Ker v. Wauchope, 1 Bli. 1, 22 (1819), quoted in ASHBURNER, supra note 145 at 50. 
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This equitable principle has been extended beyond the traditional area of wills.151  
In De Walsh v. Braman,152 for instance, the plaintiff sought a court order in equity to 
compel the defendant to convey a tract of land to plaintiff.  Defendant had spent 
money keeping the premises in repair, but he was no longer entitled to sue plaintiff at 
law to recover the cost of those repairs because the statute of limitations barred the 
debt.  The court in equity held that plaintiff, as the price of getting the order directing 
defendant to convey to plaintiff, had to pay defendant the amount that defendant had 
expended in repairs, such debt being “an equitable right growing out of the same 
subject matter.”153  He who derives the advantage ought to sustain the burden. 
And courts have quite properly applied the inverse of the principle:  he who 
refuses to sustain the burden ought not to derive the advantage.  Thus, in Feliciano v. 
Rosemar Silver Company,154 the court held that if a man and woman were not 
married to each other at the time the man sustained personal injuries, the woman 
could not recover for loss of consortium even though they had cohabited for twenty 
years.  “[The value of marriage to society] would be subverted by our recognition of 
a right to recover for loss of consortium by a person who has not accepted the 
correlative responsibilities of marriage.”155  If you want the perks, you must accept 
the works.  Who would accept the works if he could get the perks without them? 
                                                                
151The doctrine of equitable election shares some underlying assumptions with the 
taxpayer=s duty of consistency. See Steve R. Johnson, The Taxpayer=s Duty of Consistency, 46 
TAX L. REV. 537, 538 (1991) (“[A] taxpayer . . . should not be permitted to reduce his tax bill 
by reporting that one thing is true and then, after expiration of the statute of limitations, 
recanting and taking a different position on a later return.”).    For instance, Eagan v. United 
States, 80 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 1996), involved contributions to a 401(k) plan paid by an insurance 
company on behalf of a taxpayer.  If the taxpayer was a common law employee of the 
insurance company at the time the contributions were made, then, pursuant to Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 ' 402(a), he could exclude those contributions from his gross income 
for the years in which the contributions were made but would have to include them in his 
gross income in later years when they were actually distributed to him.  If, however, he was 
not a common law employee of the insurance company at the time of the contributions, then, 
pursuant to § 402(b), he would have to include the contributions in his gross income when 
they were paid into the plan but he could exclude them from gross income when they were 
later distributed.  Mr. Eagan had, in earlier years, claimed that he was a common law 
employee of the insurance company, and therefore he had excluded the contributions from his 
gross income in those earlier years.  But when he received a distribution of those contributions 
in a year after the statute of limitations barred the reassessment of his taxes for those earlier 
years, he claimed that he had not in fact been a common law employee in those earlier years 
and that, therefore, he should not be required to include those distributed contributions in his 
gross income for that later year.  The court held that the rule of consistency barred the 
taxpayer from avoiding income tax in the later year pursuant to ' 402(b) by claiming he was a 
nonemployee, when he had avoided income tax in the earlier years pursuant to ' 402(a) by 
claiming he was an employee.  80 F.3d at 18-19. 
15243 N.E. 597 (Ill. 1896). 
153Id. at 600. 
154514 N.E.2d 1095 (Mass. 1987). 
155Id. at 1096 (emphasis added). 
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Today=s law, for reasons of which I thoroughly approve,156 treats a married 
couple as an economic unit:  not in the old sense of coverture, with the husband 
totally in command and the wife a mere cypher, but in the modern sense of two 
willing persons liberally and reciprocally bound.157  Indeed, federal tax law quite 
famously treats them as an economic unit:  spouses may file a joint income tax return 
that makes no distinction between income earned by one spouse and income earned 
by the other;158 gratuitous transfers between spouses do not give rise to transfer tax 
obligations;159 sales or exchanges between spouses do not generate taxable gain or 
deductible loss;160 the list goes on.  Generally, this unitary treatment produces tax 
advantages for the couple, but not always.161  For example, section 672(e) of the 
Internal Revenue Code provides that for purposes of the grantor trust rules,162 powers 
or interests held by one spouse are deemed to be held by the other spouse.  Suppose a 
Grantor establishes a trust whose income, in the discretion of the Trustee, is to be 
distributed either to A (unrelated to the Grantor), to B (also unrelated), or to the 
Grantor.  The Grantor will have to pay the income tax on all the income, even if the 
income is in fact paid to A or B.163  The Grantor cannot avoid this result by 
substituting her spouse for herself as one of the permissible distributees (that is, by 
authorizing the trustee instead to distribute income to or among A, B, and the 
Grantor=s spouse).  But she could avoid that result if she had a domestic partner and 
substituted the partner for herself.  And the Internal Revenue Code is quite clear; if 
you qualify for the marriage bonuses, you must also accept the marriage penalties.  A 
married person cannot elect to be exempt from section 672(e). 
                                                                
156See supra text accompanying notes 15-26. 
157It is not only law that presupposes that spouses are an economic unit.  In practice, 
spouses are much more likely than domestic partners to pool their assets.  A study of 
American attitudes found that about two-thirds of all spouses immediately after marriage 
favored pooling their assets, while fewer than one-third of all unmarried heterosexual 
cohabitants favored pooling them.  J. Thomas Oldham, supra note 24, at 1424 n. 79 (citing 
PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES 94-95 (1983).  And an English 
study found that 24% of unmarried heterosexual cohabitants in fact kept their money separate, 
while only 6% of married couples did so.  Oldham, supra note 24, at 1424 n.79 (citing Helen 
Clezer & Eva Mills, Controlling the Purse Strings, 29 FAM. MATTERS 35, 35 (1991)). 
158See BORIS I. BITTKER, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR., & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL 
INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS & 44.02[2] (3d ed. 2002). 
159I. R. C. '' 2056, 2523, 2651(c)(1) (West 2005). 
160Id. ' 1041. 
161Ronnie Cohen and Susan B. Morris, Tax Issues from “Father Knows Best” to “Heather 
Has Two Mommies,” 84 TAX NOTES, Aug. 30, 1999 at 1309, 1314 n.50 (“Overall . . . , the 
Congressional Budget Office estimated that the marriage bonus exceeds the penalty by 
approximately $4 billion.”).   
162Ordinarily, a trust is a separate income-tax-paying entity, separate from the trust=s 
grantor and the trust=s beneficiaries.  In certain circumstances, however, a grantor may have 
retained so much control over or so great an interest in the trust that the trust=s gross income 
and deductions are imputed to the grantor.  In such a case, taxable income realized by the trust 
will be reported by the grantor on her return and taxed to her at her marginal rates.  I.R.C. 
'' 671-77 (West 2005). 
163I.R.C.  ' 677. 
29Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
388 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:359 
It is not only tax law that treats spouses as an economic unit.  Many states have 
enacted statutes that grant a surviving spouse the eligibility to continue certain 
licensed businesses of the deceased spouse.164  And in most states, “anyone who 
injures a married person is deemed also to have injured the spouse of that individual, 
and state laws allow the spouse to sue the tortfeasor for harm to the marital 
relationship.”165  An interesting recent case founded on this notion of spousal unity is 
International  Association of Firefighters, Local 2665 v. City of Ferguson.166  The 
city=s charter provided that certain city employees would be discharged if they 
“directly or indirectly” campaigned for or contributed money to the campaign of any 
candidate running for mayor or city counsel.  Lloyd was a firefighter employed by 
the city, and Alma was his wife.  While it was clear that Lloyd would lose his job if 
he campaigned for a mayoral candidate, Alma was concerned that Lloyd would lose 
his job if she campaigned for a mayoral candidate.  Clearly, Lloyd himself had 
standing to challenge the city charter provision on First Amendment grounds.  The 
question was, did Alma have standing to contest the city charter provision on First 
Amendment grounds?  That is, would Lloyd=s losing his job amount to an injury to 
Alma?  The court held that it would be injury to Alma and that Alma therefore had 
standing.167   
The economic unity of spouses is not a mere legal fiction or convenient (or 
inconvenient, as the case may be) concomitant of marriage.  It is the very essence of 
marriage cast in practical form:  an ineluctable condition of the intimacy and 
reciprocal dedication that is the marital bond.   
It may be important to maintain property distribution and maintenance 
rules that assume a blending of interests and award property and 
maintenance at divorce based on a model of ongoing reciprocity, not 
individual self-fulfillment.  Most important, the ideal of unity suggests 
that economic and political parity should be seen as a prerequisite for, not 
an impediment to, loving and selfless and honorable marriages.  When 
both parties are capable of independence yet opt instead for a life of 
interdependence, the union formed is far less likely to fall victim to 
one-sided exploitation.168
Because a marriage qua marriage has an economic existence, it must follow that 
when one spouse seeks to dissolve the union, he cannot simply take his economic 
                                                                
164See, e.g., D.C. CODE ' 3-405(f) (2004) (funeral director); IND. CODE ANN. ' 7.1-3-24-7 
(2004) (liquor license).  Cf. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. ' 39-3-203 (West 2003) (the surviving 
spouse of an owner-occupier of residential real estate who had enjoyed special real estate tax 
relief because he was over the age of 65 may continue to enjoy that tax relief even though she 
herself is not over 65). 
165 Bernstein, supra note 17, at 151 (citing DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 842-43 
(2000)). 
166283 F.3d 969 (8th Cir. 2002). 
167283 F.3d at 975.  But see, e.g.,  English v. Powell, 592 F.2d 727, 730 (4th Cir. 1979) (“It 
is a novel theory that a wife possesses such a property interest in her husband=s position that a 
decrease in his salary gives her an actionable claim.”). 
168 Baker, supra note 18, at 832 (footnotes omitted). 
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marbles and walk away.  The spouses’ economic interests are so intertwined and 
have so lost—or perhaps never had—their individual ancestry that judicial 
intervention is required to oversee and even prescribe an equitable method of 
economic severance.169  This imposition of exit costs on the wealthier spouse is part 
of the “works” of marriage that a person seeking the “perks” of marriage must, in 
fairness, bear.170  Allowing him, by means of some sort of idiosyncratic governing 
instrument, to opt out of this marital property obligation is inequitable. 
But to whom is it inequitable?  Inconsistency may be aesthetically unpleasing, 
even hypocritical, but it does not rise to the level of “inequitable”—“against    
conscience,” to use Lord Eldon=s more censorious phrase171—unless it does 
consistent, predictable harm.  The doctrine of equitable election172 arose in the law of 
wills as courts came to understand that allowing a legatee to accept those provisions 
of a will that benefitted her while renouncing those that disfavored her had the effect 
of injuring the testator=s other legatees.  For example, suppose a testator=s will 
provides, “I bequeath my 2,000 shares of General Motors stock to Smith, and I 
bequeath the proceeds of my Aetna life insurance policy to Jones.”  Suppose further 
that the testator does indeed own the 2,000 shares of General Motors stock at his 
death, but the designated beneficiary of the Aetna life insurance is Smith, and under 
applicable law the testator may not change by will a designated beneficiary under a 
life insurance contract.173  In other words, when the testator purported to bequeath the 
Aetna proceeds to Jones, he was in fact purporting to dispose of property that 
belonged to Smith.  Under the doctrine of equitable election, if Smith accepts the 
benefit of the will (the 2,000 shares of General Motors stock), she will be compelled 
to “accept” the detriment; that is, she will be compelled to convey the Aetna 
insurance proceeds to Jones.174  Allowing Smith to accept the stock without 
conveying the insurance proceeds to Jones would deprive Jones of a benefit that the 
testator intended to confer upon him.  Indeed, if Smith elects to forgo the benefit of 
the will and keep the Aetna proceeds, she will still receive the General Motors stock 
in the first instance but she will be required to convey to Jones so much of that stock 
as will compensate Jones for the loss of the insurance proceeds.175
                                                                
169See supra text accompanying note 34-63.  
170See supra text accompanying note140. 
171See supra text accompanying note 150. 
172See supra text accompanying notes 145-50. 
173See, e.g., Wanda Ellen Wakefield, Annotation, Effectiveness of Change of Named 
Beneficiary of Life or Accident Insurance Policy by Will, 25 A.L.R. 4th 1164 (1983). 
174See, e.g., In re Schaech=s Will, 31 N.W.2d 614 (Wis. 1948). 
1752 SIMES & SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS ' 802 n.14 (Borron 3d ed. 2003).  
Thus, if the insurance proceeds were $20,000 and the General Motors stock was worth 
$80,000, Smith would have to convey one-quarter of the stock to Jones.  But Smith could keep 
the remaining three-quarters of her bequest of the stock; the principle at work here is 
compensation, not forfeiture, since Smith had every right to retain the insurance proceeds that 
she owned before the testator=s death.  Id.  But if Smith elects to take the benefit of the will, 
she would be compelled to convey the entire insurance proceeds to Jones, even if the 
insurance proceeds were worth more than the stock. 
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Allowing married couples to customize, by prenuptial agreement, the regime for 
property-division upon dissolution is unfair to—indeed, harms—same-sex couples 
who possess all the requisites of marriage except the stipulated genders.176  Suppose 
Pat and Sandy are a same-sex couple who, because of local law, are forbidden to 
marry but not forbidden to form a domestic partnership.177  Domestic partnership 
offers Pat and Sandy none of the social magic that marriage affords opposite-sex 
couples.178  More to the point, it offers them none of the material advantages either.  
                                                                
176My equitable argument against the enforceability of prenuptial agreements is founded on 
the belief that same-sex couples ought to be allowed to marry:  that there exist no sound, moral 
grounds for denying them that right.  But an extended reassertion of same-sex marriage rights 
on this occasion would produce an unwieldy and overlong article.  Accordingly, I shall not try 
to convince any readers of the justice of same-sex couples’ claim to marriage rights.  I shall 
simply assume that readers are convinced already or, if they are not, commend to them the 
following writings in the hope that these will do the convincing:  WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, JR., THE 
CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT (1996); 
MARK STRASSER, ON SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, CIVIL UNIONS, AND THE RULE OF LAW: 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AT THE CROSSROADS (2002); Ralph Wedgwood, The 
Fundamental Argument for Same-Sex Marriage, 7 J. POL. PHIL. 225 (1999). 
As of this writing, Massachusetts is the only American jurisdiction in which same-sex 
couples may legally marry.  Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, and Spain also permit 
same-sex couples to marry.  World Briefing Americas: Canada: Gay Marriage Approved, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 21, 2005, at A6. 
177Most states permit couples to form domestic partnerships, but the permission generally 
takes the form of statutory silence rather than a specific enabling statute.  A few states have 
actually gone so far as to expressly prohibit domestic partnerships.  See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. 
1, ' IV (2004) (prohibiting only same-sex domestic partnerships); LA. CONST. art. XII, ' 15 
(2005) (prohibiting both opposite-sex and same-sex domestic partnerships); NEB. CONST. art. 
I, ' 29 (2005) (prohibiting only same-sex domestic partnerships); OHIO CONST. art. XV, ' 11 
(2005) (prohibiting both opposite-sex and same-sex domestic partnerships).  Amendments like 
those in Georgia and Nebraska are particularly invidious.  For a state to bar all couples from 
forming domestic partnerships might be defended, however unsatisfactorily, as an attempt to 
prevent the sanctioning of any form of cohabitation that does not have the benefit of a 
marriage license.  But for a state to allow opposite-sex couples to “live in sin” while 
forbidding same-sex couples to do likewise cannot be defended at all.  It is a naked display of 
anti-gay animus, and the federal Constitution forbids such legislative displays.  Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).  Indeed, a federal district court, relying on Romer, recently 
held that the Nebraska amendment violates the federal Constitution.  See Citizens for Equal 
Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1002-04 (D. Neb. 2005). 
178Marriage in America functions as a kind of credential.  It sends a cultural signal, not 
only of the married person=s “normality” but also of his trustworthiness, his maturity, his 
generosity, his attractiveness.  Conversely, bachelorhood and spinsterhood send the opposite 
signals:  unreliability, callowness, selfishness, unattractiveness.  A bachelor has not been 
elected President of the United States since 1884, when Grover Cleveland was elected to his 
first term, and he in fact married less than two years after the inauguration.  6 COLLIER=S 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 620 (1970).  In 2005, Boeing Co. fired its married chief executive for having a 
brief (heterosexual) affair with another Boeing employee, even though no pre-affair 
harassment was alleged.  Renae Merle, Boeing CEO Resigns Over Affair with Subordinate, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2005, at A01.  Although Boeing spokespersons protested that the 
company=s decision was a reaction to the executive=s bad judgment rather than to his infidelity, 
the fact remains that the company considered a man who was not faithfully married to be a 
less reliable executive than a man who was faithfully married. Id.  Film critic Pauline Kael, 
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Except in those very few states that, by statute, grant certain marital privileges to 
“registered” unmarried couples,179 Pat and Sandy have no reciprocal inheritance 
rights, no homestead rights as a survivor, no standing to maintain an action for 
wrongful death, no visitation rights if the other is hospitalized, no right to make 
medical decisions if the other becomes incapacitated. Furthermore, those 
jurisdictions that do grant particular rights to registered domestic partners frequently 
impose preconditions on the formation of a domestic partnership that are not 
imposed on marriages.180  And even if Pat and Sandy married each other in 
Massachusetts, the one American jurisdiction that recognizes same-sex marriages, 
they still would be ineligible for any of the federal tax advantages granted to married 
couples generally.181
                                                           
famous for her scathing wit, was once scolded by a listener (Kael was at that time the film 
critic for Berkeley, California, radio station KPFA-FM) who attributed Ms. Kael=s acerbity to 
her being unmarried:  “[Dear] Miss Kael, I assume you aren=t marriedCone loses that nasty, 
sharp bite in one=s voice when one learns to care about others.”  See PAULINE KAEL, I LOST IT 
AT THE MOVIES 228 (1994). 
The authors of the 1980 film comedy Airplane! (Paramount Pictures) poked some 
mischievous fun at our craving for marriage=s social magic.  When one of the female flight 
attendants, Randy, learns that the eponymous aircraft is in danger of crashing, she starts to cry: 
DR. RUMACK.  Randy, are you all right? 
RANDY.  Oh, Dr. Rumack, I=m scared.  I=ve never been so scared.  And besides, I=m 26 
and I=m not married. 
DR. RUMACK.  We=re going to make it, you=ve got to believe that. 
[a Woman Passenger comes in] 
WOMAN.  Dr. Rumack, do you have any idea when we=ll be landing? 
DR. RUMACK.  Pretty soon, how are you bearing up? 
WOMAN.  Well, to be honest, I=ve never been so scared.  At least I have a husband. 
[Randy cries harder] 
AIRPLANE! (Paramount Pictures 1980), available at http://www.imdb.com/title//tt0080339/ 
quotes.  The wonderful phrase “social magic” is not my own.  See Lawrence Lessig, The 
Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 959 n.42 (1995). 
179See CAL. FAM. CODE '' 297-299.6 (West 2004) (“domestic partners”); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
'' 26:8A-1 to -12 (West Supp. 2005) (“domestic partnerships”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 
'' 1201-07 (2002) (“civil unions”); 2005 Conn. Acts 10 (January Sess.) (“civil union”).  
Hawaii has created the status of “reciprocal beneficiaries,” HAW. REV. STAT. '' 572C-1 to -6 
(1999), who, upon registration, are granted a few mutual rights, but reciprocal beneficiaries, 
unlike the parties registering under the California, Connecticut, New Jersey, or Vermont 
statutes, need not intend to make mutual emotional commitments and do not receive most of 
the state privileges attending marriage.  Id. ' 572C-6. 
180California and New Jersey, for example, require the partners to share the same 
residence before they can register as domestic partners.  CAL. FAM. CODE ' 297(b)(1) (West 
2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. '' 26:8A-4(b)(1) (West Supp. 2005).  No such cohabitation 
requirement is—or constitutionally may be—imposed on would-be spouses.  Turner v. Safley, 
482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987).  See generally Jeffrey G. Sherman, Domestic Partnership and 
ERISA Preemption, 76 TUL. L. REV. 373, 386-89 (2001). 
181Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 4219 (1996) (codified as 
amended at 1 U.S.C. ' 7 (2000), 28 U.S.C. ' 1738C (2000)): 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or 
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, 
the word “marriage” means only a legal union between one man and one woman as 
33Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
392 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:359 
Compared with a married, opposite-sex couple, Pat and Sandy have only one 
advantage as domestic partners:  at least, it is an advantage for the wealthier partner.  
The partner may, by contractual prearrangement, limit his or her financial obligations 
should the partnership dissolve.  So long as heterosexual legislators (and their 
heterosexual constituents) can continue to enjoy all the advantages of marriage and 
yet capture, by means of enforceable prenuptial agreements, the one advantage still 
available to same-sex couples in domestic partnerships, they will have little incentive 
to end this invidious discrimination182 either by creating for same-sex couples a more 
robust domestic partnership or by extending marriage rights to same-sex couples. 
The intentional exclusion of same-sex couples from the benefits of marriage 
reflects a view of marriage as a sacred institution whose essence endures 
independently of the shifting preferences of legislatures and citizens.183  But this 
view of marriage was repudiated by the prenuptial agreement revolution of the 
1970s.  Courts began to enforce prenuptial agreements only when they came to see 
marriage not as a sacred union but as a legal arrangement shaped for the convenience 
of spouses and would-be spouses.184  And if marriage is purely a creature of secular 
law, offering by legislative fiat a number of disparate accompaniments designed to 
keep the package desirable (e.g., testimonial privilege, income-splitting for tax 
purposes, enforceable prenups to keep the exit costs low), then no logical basis exists 
for restricting that package to opposite-sex couples.185  The argument for excluding 
                                                           
husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex 
who is a husband or a wife. 
Id. 
182Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex 
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U.L. REV. 197, 216-19 (1994).   
The central outrage of [male-male sex] is that a man is reduced to the status of a 
woman, which is understood to be degrading.  Just as miscegenation was threatening 
because it called into question the distinctive and superior status of being white, 
homosexuality is threatening because it calls into question the distinctive and superior 
status of being male.   
Id. at 235-36.  See also supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
183For example, Congressman Roscoe Bartlett (R-Md.) made the following remarks on the 
floor of the United States House of Representatives with respect to H.J.. Res. 106, the 
Marriage Protection Amendment: 
Mr. Speaker, there seems to be some confusion as to what constitutes marriage.  In the 
Christian community, and we are a Christian Nation, you can affirm that by going 
back to our Founding Fathers and their belief in how we started, among Christians, 
marriage is generally recognized as having started in the Garden of Eden.  You may 
go back to Genesis to find that and you will note there that God created Adam and 
Eve.  He did not create Adam and Steve.  A union between other than a man and a 
woman may be something legally, but it just cannot be a marriage, because marriage 
through 5,000 years of recorded history has always been a relationship between a man 
and a woman. 
150 CONG. REC. H7888-02 (2004). 
184See supra text accompanying notes 88-93. 
185Indeed, the benefits derived by society when citizens are freed from the pressures of 
intimacy-competition (and thereby permitted to direct more of their energies outward toward 
the community at large) would presumably increase if that freedom were made available to 
same-sex couples.  See supra notes 17-19, and accompanying text. 
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same-sex couples from marriage necessarily relies on the “sacredness” notion.  But 
the recent and now-cherished availability of prenuptial agreements, which allow 
spouses to slip their sacred bonds inexpensively, undercuts that supposed 
commitment to sacredness and exposes this exclusionary policy as simply a policy of 
discrimination designed to maintain a social and legal hierarchy based on sexual 
orientation.  Reviving the old rule that barred the enforcement of prenuptial 
agreements would somewhat mitigate this discrimination by reducing the range of 
the hypocrisy used to justify the discrimination and by denying married couples the 
inequitable opportunity of enjoying the perks without the works. 
When the shoe is on the other foot and new circumstances provide same-sex 
couples with more household options than are available to opposite-sex couples, the 
authorities have refused to tolerate such “reverse” discrimination for long.  Less than 
a year after Vermont=s groundbreaking civil union statute became effective,186 the 
University of Vermont, which had been granting benefits to both married couples 
and same-sex domestic partners, announced that henceforth same-sex partners would 
qualify for university benefits only if they formally established a civil union and 
obtained a civil union license pursuant to the Vermont statute.187  “A university 
spokesman said that not instituting the policy could be seen as discriminatory 
against heterosexual couples in long-term relationships[,] who must be married to 
obtain spousal benefits.”188  Shortly after the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts held that the state=s constitution required that same-sex couples be 
permitted to marry on the same terms as opposite-sex couples,189 Boston=s Beth Israel 
Deaconess Medical Center announced that it would eliminate domestic-partner 
benefits for same-sex couples, for reasons analogous to those given by the University 
of Vermont.  If same-sex couples wanted the Medical Center=s employee benefits, 
the couples had to marry.190
Just as these employers quite properly refused to allow same-sex couples to enjoy 
the perks (employee fringe benefits) without the works (marriage or registration) 
where opposite-sex couples could not, so the law should refuse to allow opposite-sex 
couples to enjoy the perks (marriage=s social and economic magic) without the works 
(the prospect of equitable distribution) where same-sex couples cannot. 
V.  SPECULATIONS ABOUT STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR 
Would a rule barring the enforcement of prenuptial agreements adversely affect 
the number of marriages?  That is, are there so many people whose willingness to 
                                                                
186“An Act Relating to Civil Unions,” VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 '' 1201-07 (2005) (effective 
Apr. 26, 2000). 
187Richard Higgins, UVM Revises Domestic-Partner Policy Legal Unions Now Required, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 28, 2000, at B3. 
188Id. (emphasis added); see also Sherman, supra note 180, at 385 n.37. 
189Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
190Equal Marriage, Equal Treatment, THE ADVOCATE, June 8, 2004, at 20.  But see 
Kimberly Blanton, Benefits for Domestic Partners Maintained, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 22, 
2004, at G1 (noting that the Medical Center was persuaded to suspend its decision to abolish 
domestic partner benefits, inasmuch as a pending amendment to the state constitution casts 
doubt on the permanence of same-sex marriage rights in Massachusetts).   
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marry depends on their power to avoid equitable distribution upon divorce that the 
marriage rate would go down measurably if that power were removed?191  This 
question of incentive is worth some speculation.192
Before indulging in that speculation, however, I must observe that an affirmative 
answer to my question—that is, a finding that the marriage rate would indeed go 
down if my proposal were adopted—does not necessarily argue against the proposal.  
As Professor Baker has urged, marriages conditioned on a prenuptial waiver may be 
less than deserving of all the encouragement and deference that society gives them.193  
Now some readers might object to the dismissal of such marriages.  They might say, 
if an impecunious woman must choose between remaining single and entering into a 
financially one-sided marriage, who are we to disparage the latter choice?  “[F]or 
those without power, sometimes the only alternative to a bad bargain is no bargain at 
all, and it is not clear why it always would be to someone=s benefit to have that 
choice taken away. . . . There may be situations when a woman would only be able to 
marry if she were able to bind herself to a premarital agreement, and she would 
prefer to be married with the agreement rather than unmarried and >protected= from 
that agreement.”194
Two responses come to mind.  First, my objection to prenuptial agreements does 
not spring from the belief that they hurt women.  It springs from a belief that they are 
inequitable, given the rationale for the “tremendous . . . subsidies” that our society 
confers on married persons on account of their marital status.195  And to perpetuate 
this inequity in the hope of benefitting marriageable women simply shifts the locus 
of victimization without addressing the root causes of women=s financial 
disadvantage.  My second response is that eliminating prenuptial agreements might 
actually enhance women=s bargaining power.  Under current law, a woman might be 
loath to reject a marriage proposal conditioned on her signing a prenup for fear that if 
she declined to sign it, her suitor would look elsewhere and find a woman who was 
willing to sign.  Under my proposal, she would compete for her beau on her merits, 
not on her submissiveness.  A man seeking the benefits of marriage would not be 
able to shop around for a more tractable candidate; he would have to choose between 
a life of celibacy and a life of marriage in the shadow of equitable distribution. 
When one studies the American marriage rate over the last half-century, one 
notes that significant events in the shift toward routine enforcement of all prenuptial 
agreements—the Posner case (1970),196 the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act 
(1983),197 and the Simeone case (1990),198 for instance—seem to have had no 
                                                                
191Throughout this discussion, we shall assume that it is the man who is the wealthier and 
more independent of the two prospective spouses, see generally, Brod, supra note 7, and that 
if a change in the enforceability rules were to have any effect on marriage rates, it would have 
its effect by influencing men=s behavior rather than women=s. 
192Unfortunately, speculation is all that is possible; the data necessary to support a true 
regression analysis have not been collected. 
193See Baker, supra note 18, at 832. 
194 Bix, supra note 5, at 206, 204. 
195See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
196See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
197See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
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observable impact on the statistics.199  The following graph illustrates the changes in 
the annual American marriage rate (marriages per 1,000 total population200) from 
1953 to 2003.201
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If the marriage rate and the enforceability of prenuptial agreements bore some 
positive relation to each other, one would expect the marriage rate to have increased 
                                                           
198See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
199Another year that might provisionally be supposed to have affected marriage rates is 
1992.  The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), Pub. L. No. 
93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. '' 1001-1461 (1994 & Supp. V 
1999)), guarantees certain benefits to the surviving spouse of an employee covered by an 
employer=s pension benefit plan:  benefits that cannot be taken away without the spouse=s 
written consent.  ERISA ' 205, 29 U.S.C. ' 1055. See generally 1 MICHAEL J. CANAN, 
QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS ' 7.16[C]-[F] (2005).  Back when the provision was still new, 
many practitioners wondered whether a provision in a prenuptial agreement could serve as an 
effective waiver of this ERISA-mandated benefit, but in 1992 a number of cases made it clear 
that the benefit could not be waived prenuptially.  See, e.g., Nellis v. Boeing Co., 1992 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 8510 (D. Kan. 1992); Zinn v. Donaldson Co., 799 F. Supp. 69 (D. Minn. 1992); 
Hurwitz v. Sher, 789 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff=d, 982 F.2d 778 (2d. Cir. 1992).  
Interpreting ERISA ' 205(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. ' 1055(c)(2), these courts held that only an 
employee=s “spouse” can effectively waive her ' 205 rights; and at the time of signing a 
prenuptial agreement she is not yet a spouse but only a fiancée.  Thus, beginning in 1992, 
prospective husbands knew very well that a prenuptial agreement would not be enforced to the 
extent it purported to dispose of the wife=s survivorship rights in the husband=s pension.  It 
would be unsound, however, to regard these 1992 developments as a trial run for my proposal, 
inasmuch as my proposal deals with enforceability on divorce, not with the much less 
controversial questions of enforceability on death.  See supra note 5 and accompanying text.  
ERISA does not mandate any spousal benefits in the event of divorce. 
200For census years, “population” means population enumerated as of April 1 of that year.  
For all other years, population is estimated as of July 1. 
201These statistics were collected from the relevant issues of the Ctrs. for Disease Control 
& Prevention, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Monthly Vital Statistics Reports. 
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in the years since the agreements first became routinely enforceable.  Yet, except for 
a brief upsurge in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the marriage rate seems to have 
fallen steadily over the past thirty-five years.  And in the years from 1958 to 1969, 
years when divorce-focused prenuptial agreements were not enforceable, the 
marriage rate increased rather sharply. 
Fluctuations in the marriage rate seem to have occurred independently of 
developments in the law of prenuptial agreements.  Those who have compiled and 
studied these data attribute the fluctuations to “demographic and behavioral 
changes”202
One reason for the recent decline in the marriage rate is that the majority 
of the very large baby boom cohort (people born between 1946 and 1964) 
have aged past their twenties and thirties, which are the peak marriage 
years.  In addition, it has been estimated that the percent of adults 
expected [ever] to marry has dropped from 95 to 90 percent. 
The general decline reflected in the marriage rate per 1,000 population is 
also evident in rates for the population eligible to marry, unmarried men 
and women 15 years of age and over.  These rates have been declining for 
more than 20 years and were lower in 1994 than in 1993.  The marriage 
rate per 1,000 unmarried women 15 years of age and over in 1994 (51.5) 
was 2 percent lower than the rate in 1993 (52.3).  The decline in the 
comparable marriage rate for unmarried men was 3 percent, from 61.4 in 
1993 to 59.5 in 1994.203
If one is concerned about minimizing strategic behavior in connubial decisions, 
one must admit that prenuptial agreements themselves provoke considerable strategic 
behavior.  For example, scholars and practitioners have long recommended that 
prospective spouses include a “sunset” provision in their prenuptial agreements:  a 
provision that phases out or abruptly eliminates contractual limitations on each 
spouse’s claims to the other’s property after the marriage has lasted for a specified 
number of years.  “[P]renuptial agreements are designed to govern a relationship not 
yet begun, one that may be fragile at the time of drafting but grows strong and 
durable over the years.”204  Yet this seemingly benign provision can actually goad an 
                                                                
202GOPAL K. SINGH, T.J. MATHEWS, SALLY C. CLARKE, TRINA YANNICOS & BETTY L. 
SMITH, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ANNUAL SUMMARY OF BIRTHS, 
MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, AND DEATHS:  UNITED STATES, 1994 (1995), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/mvsr/mv43_ 13.pdf. 
203Id. The authors of the summary do not specify the “behavioral changes” that have 
reduced “the percent of adults expected [ever] to marry,” but presumably these changes 
include the increased social acceptability of nonmarital cohabitation, out-of-wedlock births, 
and homosexuality (that is, less pressure on gay people to choose marriage as a way of 
hiding), and a general pessimism about marriage engendered by the discouragingly high 
divorce rate.  See generally Robert D. Mare & Christopher Winship, Socioeconomic Change 
and the Decline of Marriage for Blacks and Whites, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 175 
(Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds. 1991). 
204Leah Guggenheimer, A Modest Proposal: The Feminomics of Drafting Premarital 
Agreements, 17 WOMEN’S RIGHTS L. REP. 147, 207 (1996); see also, Bix, supra note 5, at 179-
82. 
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ambivalent spouse into divorce proceedings as the sunset deadline approaches, lest 
he forfeit the financial insulation the agreement provides him.205
Indeed, it is difficult to envision a legal design that does not invite strategic 
behavior.   In In re Honigman,206 a man bequeathed to his wife, whom he had come 
to loathe,207 the rather odd sum of $2,500 outright plus a life interest in one-half of 
the residue of his estate.208  Why did this unhappy husband make this somewhat 
curious bequest?  Why not leave her nothing at all?  Or why not leave her $500 
instead of $2,500?  New York’s elective share statute at the time granted a spouse in 
Mrs. Honigman’s position the right to renounce her husband’s will and claim one-
half of his estate outright, regardless of how little the will itself purported to leave 
her.  However, this same statute also denied the wife this “forced share” in the event 
the husband’s will left her at least $2,500 outright and bequeathed at least one-half 
the residue in trust for her lifetime benefit.209  Now Mr. Honigman’s motive for his 
curious bequest becomes clear.  The amount was neither whimsical nor arbitrary; it 
was strategic.  He left her the minimum amount that would bar her from claiming her 
elective share.  Contractual terms, common law default rules, and statutory rules all 
prompt individuals to act differently from the way they would act in the absence of 
those terms or rules, so it is foolish to object to a rule merely because it will cause 
individuals to alter their behavior in calculating ways. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Prenuptial agreements should be held per se unenforceable to the extent they 
purport to limit a spouse’s entitlements to alimony or equitable distribution of 
property in the event of divorce.  To allow married persons to cherry-pick the 
concomitants of their marriage—to avail themselves of the advantages the law 
confers upon them while evading, by governing instrument, the burdens the law 
would impose upon them—is inequitable.  If they want the perks, they must take the 
works.  If a marriage-bent couple wishes to preserve the low exit costs associated 
                                                                
205Donald Trump and his second wife, Marla Maples, executed a prenuptial agreement that 
capped her rights in Mr. Trump’s property in the event of divorce at $1 million to $5 million, 
instead of the equitable distribution share of Trump’s total wealth to which she would have 
been entitled without the contract.  The contract contained a sunset provision, however, and 
Trump filed for divorce only eleven months before the sunset provision extinguished the 
contractual cap.  The New York Times reported that Trump’s timing in filing for divorce was 
not coincidental.  “[He] has been forced economically to act.”  Bruce Weber, Donald and 
Marla Are Headed for Divestiture, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1997, at 127.  Had Jack Welch acted 
before the sunset deadline in his prenuptial agreement, he would have saved a great deal of 
money.  See Keil, supra note 79.  Actor Tom Cruise and his second wife separated only days 
before their tenth anniversary.  At the time Cruise filed his petition for divorce, “California 
courts presumptively awarded lifetime support to spouses married at least ten years before 
separation.  In marriages of shorter duration, the California custom ha[d] been to award 
support for, at most, half the duration of the marriage.”  Oldham, supra note 24, at 1422. 
206168 N.E.2d 676 (N.Y. 1960). 
207Id. at 677. 
208Id. 
209JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, & ESTATES 172 (6th ed. 
2000). 
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with domestic partnership, then the couple must settle for domestic partnership in its 
entirety. 
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